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and future research in the area of channel allowances.
KEYWORDS: Channel Allowances, Distribution Channels, Customer Loyalty,
Salesperson Influence, Salesperson Performance

William Jason Rowe
Student‘s Signature

.

7/12/2010
Date

.

AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
DOWNSTREAM CHANNEL ALLOWANCES

By
William Jason Rowe

Dr. Steven J. Skinner
.
Director of Dissertation
Dr. Merl Hackbart
.
Director of Graduate Studies
7/12/2010

.
Date

RULES FOR THE USE OF DISSERTATIONS
Unpublished dissertations submitted for the Doctor‘s degree and deposited in the
University of Kentucky Library are as a rule open for inspection, but are to be used only
with due regard to the rights of the authors. Bibliographical references may be noted, but
quotations or summaries of parts may be published only with the permission of the
author, and with the usual scholarly acknowledgements.
Extensive copying or publication of the dissertation in whole or in part also requires the
consent of the Dean of the Graduate School of the University of Kentucky.
A library that borrows this dissertation for use by its patrons is expected to secure the
signature of each user.

Name

Date

_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________

DISSERTATION

William Jason Rowe

The Graduate School
University of Kentucky
2010

AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
DOWNSTREAM CHANNEL ALLOWANCES

DISSERTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the College of Business and Economics
at the University of Kentucky

By
William Jason Rowe
Lexington, Kentucky
Director: Dr. Steven J. Skinner, Rosenthal Professor of Marketing
Lexington, Kentucky
2010
Copyright © William Jason Rowe 2010

For my wife, Christina, and my sons, Callaway and Finnigan

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
During my time at the University of Kentucky I have experienced a great deal of
professional and personal development. Many people deserve credit for guiding the way.
Above all, my time at UK has been enhanced by the mentoring of Professor Steve
Skinner. With seeming intuition, Professor Skinner delivered the motivation I needed at
the various times when it was needed most. Although I can never fully return what he
has given to me, I am eternally grateful for his direction, advice, and support which
continue still today.
In addition to Professor Skinner, I also owe a great deal of gratitude to my
committee members for reading each draft and providing thoughtful feedback.
Professors Bob Dahlstrom, Brian Murtha, and Richard Smith made the process
enjoyable, challenging, and rewarding with their contributions. Each committee member
brought a unique perspective to the process leading to an overall more meaningful and
interesting dissertation. It is safe to say that no stone was left unturned under the
watchful eyes of my committee.
Beyond my committee there are several other scholars who have helped a great
deal. Specifically, Professors Emily Plant, Matt Seevers, David Hardesty, Fred Mader,
and Deanna Mader along with soon-to-be Professor Hulda Black have contributed more
to my development and this dissertation than any of them realize. I arrived at the
University of Kentucky with Hulda and Emily and their partnership over the last four
years has been invaluable. Matt Seevers became a trusted advisor over a year before I
began my doctoral work and has remained a friend and co-author. David Hardesty was
the person who ‗showed me the ropes‘ of life as an academic. Finally, I would not have
found my way in this profession without Professors Fred and Deanna Mader at Marshall
iii

University. Our relationship dates back 20 years and has endured my undergraduate
work and graduate work at Marshall, my professional career in sales and marketing, and
my doctoral work over the past four years.
Most importantly and in no certain order, I want to thank my wife Christina, my
sons Callaway and Finnigan and my mother Patricia. These are the four most important
people in my life. Together, they provided the direction, accountability, and motivation
to complete my doctoral work. At the most challenging times during my doctoral work I
would look at Callaway and Finnigan. The responsibility of children is a powerful
motivator and makes any amount of effort worthwhile. I look forward to helping
Callaway and Finnigan develop and find their own passion and path in life.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... ix
List of Figures ..................................................................................................................... x
Chapter 1, Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................... 1
Downstream Channel Allowances Conceptualization .................................................... 2
Research Gap ................................................................................................................ 10
Study Description.......................................................................................................... 10
Problem Statement ........................................................................................................ 11
Contributions................................................................................................................. 11
Chapter 2, Literature Review............................................................................................ 13
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 13
Downstream Channel Allowances ................................................................................ 13
Overview ................................................................................................................... 13
Schools of Thought ................................................................................................... 17
The Efficiency School ........................................................................................... 18
The Market Power School ..................................................................................... 18
Marketing Literature ................................................................................................. 19
New Product Introduction ..................................................................................... 19
Competition and Pricing ........................................................................................ 21
Consumer Welfare ................................................................................................. 21
Economics ................................................................................................................. 22
New Product Introduction ..................................................................................... 22
Exclusionary Effects .............................................................................................. 22
Competition and Pricing ........................................................................................ 23
Public Policy ............................................................................................................. 23
Antitrust Issues ...................................................................................................... 23
Product Discrimination .......................................................................................... 24
General Policy Issues............................................................................................. 25
Salesperson Influence ................................................................................................... 33
Salesperson-Owned Loyalty and Firm-Owned Loyalty ............................................... 44
Cognitive Evaluation Theory ........................................................................................ 45
v

Overview ................................................................................................................... 45
Prior Research Applications ...................................................................................... 45
Research Gap ................................................................................................................ 47
Chapter 3, Research Model .............................................................................................. 49
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 49
Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................. 51
Explanatory Variables ............................................................................................... 51
Salesperson Influence ............................................................................................ 51
Customer Investments ........................................................................................... 52
Salesperson- and Firm-Owned Loyalty ................................................................. 52
Outcome Variables .................................................................................................... 53
Salesperson Performance with the Customer and Selling Firm Performance ....... 53
Moderator Variable ................................................................................................... 54
Perceived Salesperson Control of Channel Allowances ........................................ 54
Control Variables ...................................................................................................... 58
Hypotheses .................................................................................................................... 58
Salesperson Influence and Performance Outcomes .................................................. 58
Salesperson-Owned Loyalty and Performance Outcomes ........................................ 59
Perceived Salesperson Control of Channel Allowances as a Moderator .................. 59
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 62
Chapter 4, Methodology ................................................................................................... 63
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 63
Research Setting............................................................................................................ 63
Research Design............................................................................................................ 64
Measurement of Research Variables ............................................................................ 66
Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances .......................................................... 66
Salesperson Influence ................................................................................................ 66
Customer Investments ............................................................................................... 70
Salesperson- and Firm-Owned Loyalty..................................................................... 70
Salesperson and Selling Firm Performance............................................................... 70
Control Variables ...................................................................................................... 71
Data Collection and Preparation ................................................................................... 72
vi

Measurement Validation ............................................................................................... 72
Data Analysis ................................................................................................................ 73
Chapter 5, Results ............................................................................................................. 77
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 77
Response Rate ............................................................................................................... 77
Non-response Bias ........................................................................................................ 77
Key Informant Check .................................................................................................... 78
Data Preparation............................................................................................................ 79
Measurement of Study Variables .................................................................................. 79
Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances .......................................................... 79
Customer Investments ............................................................................................... 82
Salesperson-Owned Loyalty ..................................................................................... 83
Firm-Owned Loyalty ................................................................................................. 84
Salesperson Influence ................................................................................................ 86
Salesperson Performance with the Customer ............................................................ 87
Control Variables ...................................................................................................... 88
Measurement Model ..................................................................................................... 89
Partial Measurement Model .......................................................................................... 91
Hypothesis Testing........................................................................................................ 92
Structural Model Fitting ............................................................................................ 92
Main Effect Hypotheses ............................................................................................ 96
Moderation Hypothesis Testing ................................................................................ 96
Post Hoc Analysis ......................................................................................................... 98
Structural Equation Modeling ................................................................................... 98
Multiple Regression .................................................................................................. 99
Hypothesized Moderation...................................................................................... 99
Post Hoc Model ....................................................................................................... 103
Summary ..................................................................................................................... 105
Chapter 6, Discussion ..................................................................................................... 107
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 107
Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 107
Theoretical Implications ............................................................................................. 109
vii

Managerial Implications ............................................................................................. 110
Limitations .................................................................................................................. 112
Future Research .......................................................................................................... 113
Summary ..................................................................................................................... 115
Appendix ........................................................................................................................ 116
References ...................................................................................................................... 122
Vita ................................................................................................................................. 129

viii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1, Common Definitions of Slotting Allowances and Related Practices…………6
Table 2.1, Common Terms Used to Describe Downstream Payment Practices…...…....15
Table 2.2, Key Studies of Downstream Channel Allowance Practices………………….26
Table 2.3, Prior Research Constructs of Salesperson Influence Methods……………….34
Table 2.4, Salesperson Influence Tactics Taxonomy and Definitions………………......43
Table 3.2, Downstream Channel Allowances Practices – Terminology and
Definitions……………………………………………………………………………….56
Table 4.1, Research Variables and Data Collection Method……………………...…….65
Table 4.2, Model Variables………………………………………………………..…….67
Table 5.1, Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations……………………100
Table 5.2, Summary of Hypotheses and Support Found………………………………106

ix

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1, Customer-Seller Exchange……………………………………………………3
Figure 3.1, Overall Research Model…………………………………………….………50
Figure 3.2, Theoretical Model of Moderation Hypotheses………………..…………….61
Figure 4.1a, Moderation of Salesperson Influence and Salesperson Performance...……74
Figure 4.1b, Moderation of Customer Investments and Salesperson-Owned Loyalty.…75
Figure 5.1, Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances – CFA……………………...82
Figure 5.2, Salesperson-Owned Loyalty – CFA…………………………………….…..84
Figure 5.3, Firm-Owned Loyalty – CFA…………………………………………….….85
Figure 5.4, Salesperson Influence – CFA………………………………………….……87
Figure 5.5, Salesperson Performance with Customer – CFA………………..………….88
Figure 5.6, Full Measurement Model………………………………………..…….…….90
Figure 5.7, Hypothesized Structural Model………………………………………..……93
Figure 5.8, Respecified Structural Model…………………………………………..…...95
Figure 5.9, Moderating Effect of PSCA on Customer Investments and Loyalty……...102
Figure 5.10, Moderating Effect of PSCA on Loyalty and Performance with
Customer……………………………………………………………………………….105

x

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Downstream channel allowances, also referred to simply as ‗channel allowances‘,
occur when a seller makes a payment to a downstream channel partner, typically a
buying firm, in exchange for distribution of a product or service. There is an ongoing
debate as to the advantages and disadvantages of this pay-to-play practice. Although
scholars have examined this phenomenon from both perspectives, very little, if any, work
has focused on the unintended consequences that such payments may have in an
exchange context.

I propose the following dissertation as the initial step in

understanding the undermining effect that downstream channel allowances may have on
variables which are important to sales managers, salespeople, and the customers they
serve.

BACKGROUND
The practice of sellers making payments to customers in order to gain access to a
distribution channel is widespread.

Therefore, this research is relevant to multiple

industries and academic disciplines. Specifically, this research has relevance to the fields
of marketing, economics, public policy, and ethics.

Further, our current state of

knowledge regarding these payments between channel partners is severely lacking. In
particular, there is an absence of any guidance as to how these types of payments may be
used effectively by selling firms. My research takes the initial step toward addressing this
knowledge gap by investigating the unintended consequences of payments such as
downstream channel allowances which may be present in the customer-salesperson
exchange.
To date, scholars have examined the general practice of slotting fees (e.g., Bone,
France, and Riley 2006), the ongoing debate over the channel effects of slotting fees
(e.g., Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon 2000; Marx and Schaffer 2007), the relevance of
slotting fees to new product development (e.g., Rao and Mahi 2003; Sudhir and Rao
2006; Desiraju 2001; Richards and Patterson 2004), and the case of slotting fees from a
public policy perspective (e.g., Wilkie, Desrochers, and Gundlach 2002). However,
empirical research on slotting fees remains scarce. What knowledge is available tends to
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focus on the case of powerful retailers requiring manufacturers to pay slotting fees to
gain distribution of a new product. Little, if any, effort has been put into investigating
the incidence of manufacturers wanting to pay slotting fees as a way to gain product
distribution, develop brands, build market share, grow top line revenue, and improve
bottom line results. Additionally, little is known about how and to what extent slotting
fees may be factored into marketing strategy and sales processes.
There are more unanswered questions about slotting fees than could possibly be
addressed here. Thus, the focus of this study is on a portion of the many questions which
remain unanswered. Specifically, do firms undermine the efforts of salespeople when
they use slotting fees as a component of marketing strategy even if these fees are not
required by customers? What is the impact of applying slotting fees from a financial
perspective (e.g., selling-firm financial outcomes) and from a relational perspective (e.g.,
salesperson-owned loyalty)?

These questions will be systematically addressed by

conducting a comprehensive literature review, analyzing secondary firm-level data,
collecting survey data to bridge any gaps left after the initial data analysis, and using
cognitive evaluation theory to guide the overall research effort. The findings of this
study are certain to hold implications for scholars and practitioners concerned with
marketing strategy and the role of slotting fees. Future research on slotting fees will
continue to advance our understanding of this practice in marketing strategy as well as
address issues relevant to ethics and public policy.

DOWNSTREAM CHANNEL ALLOWANCES CONCEPTUALIZATION
In a traditional customer-seller exchange a product or service flows from the seller to the
customer while financial consideration flows from the customer back to the seller. This
is a common type of exchange studied by marketing scholars. This type of exchange
may take place between a business and a consumer or between two businesses. In the
business-to-business exchange the practice of sellers paying customers to buy; or from a
different perspective, sellers paying customers in order to sell; has become increasingly
common. See figure 1-1 below.
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FIGURE 1.1
Customer-Seller Exchanges
Traditional Exchange vs. Pay-to-Play Exchange
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This pay-to-play phenomenon goes by many names across multiple industries.
Specific to the marketing literature, this practice is referred to as slotting fees, display
fees, failure fees, pay-to-stay fees, presentation fees, and merchandising allowances
among many others.

However, there is a fundamental problem with using multiple

descriptives, often in a generic way, to describe all such pay-to-play practices.
First, the most common of these terms, slotting fee, is outdated. Slotting fee was
originally used in reference to manufacturers paying for ‗slots‘ in the warehouse of a
distributor. There were costs associated with adding products in the warehouse so a
slotting fee was charged to the manufacturer as a way of transferring those costs. Today,
the term slotting fee is used to describe many different arrangements such as paying for
shelf space in a retail store or paying for product placement on a website.
Second, the term has become outdated from a legal perspective. For example,
when the Federal Trade Commission (2003) questioned retail customers regarding the
practice of slotting fees, customers frequently stated that their company did not charge
nor accept slotting fees. While technically true, many of these companies did extract
payments from sellers in other ways such as promotional and advertising allowances,
failure fees, or charge-backs. While these practices are not technically ―slotting fees‖,
they are effectively the same. That is, financial consideration being paid by the seller to
the customer in exchange for either initial or continued access to a distribution channel.
Third, these fees and allowances are not solely being charged by customers to
sellers. In fact, manufacturing firms frequently offer payment, in these many forms, as a
way to gain access within a channel of distribution. For example, a consumer goods
manufacturer may offer a merchandising allowance to a retailer in exchange for
distribution or additional space in the retailer‘s store.
4

Similarly, an appliance

manufacturer may offer payment, in some form, to a home builder in exchange for
placement of the manufacturer‘s appliances in model homes. The possible forms of
payment are virtually endless and the exchange partners too numerous to count when
attempting to investigate this pervasive phenomenon. Refer to table 1.1 for a sample of
the many different definitions used to define slotting fees and related practices.
Thus, in an effort to combine all of these various payments into one concept and
to allow for concise study, I propose the conceptualization of downstream channel
allowances to describe any form of financial consideration flowing from a seller to a
customer with the intended outcome of gaining access to a distribution channel
controlled by the downstream channel partner (i.e., the customer). The focus of this
dissertation is on the application of downstream channel allowances on the form
monetary payment, as opposed in-kind gifts for example.

5

TABLE 1.1
Common Definitions of Slotting Allowances and Related Practices
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Author(s)

Definition

Aalberts and Jennings (1999, p. 207)

―Slotting fees are fees manufacturers pay to retailers in order to obtain retail shelf
space.‖

Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon (2000)

slotting fees and allowances' have been broadened to describe a family of marketing
practices that involve payments and other incentives (e.g., free products or services)
given by manufacturers to persuade downstream channel members to stock, display, and
support their products (Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon 2000 from Wilkie, Desrochers,
and Gundlach 2002)

Bone, France, and Riley (2006, p. 224)

―Slotting fees, also known as slotting allowances, are up-front, lump-sum payments from
manufacturers to retailers to obtain new product distribution.‖

Cannon and Bloom (1991, p. 168)

―A slotting allowance is a one-time payment paid by a manufacturer to a grocer or
wholesaler as part of the terms required to distribute a new item.‖
―Slotting allowances differ from more traditional forms of trade promotion in three ways.
First, slotting allowances are usually negotiated, and therefore vary from customer to
customer. Second, the payments are often lump-sum, up-front cash, not based on actual
purchases. The guidelines set forth by Robinson-Patman Act Section 2(d) require that
promotional allowances be paid on proportionally equal terms across all customers.

TABLE 1.1, CONTINUED
This has usually meant that trade allowances are based on actual dollar or unit volume
purchased. Third, the magnitude of individual payments can be much greater than other
forms of trade promotion.‖
―(Slotting) allowances are the controversial fees charged by retailers to allow
shelf space for new products.‖

Gundlach and Bloom (1998, p. 174)

―(Slotting allowances are) payments to retailers for stocking and displaying new
products, or for other support services…‖

Israilevich (2004, p. 143)

―Slotting allowances are lump-sum, up-front payments from a manufacturer to a
retailer to have a new stock-keeping unit (SKU) carried by the retailer and placed on its
shelves.‖
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Desiraju (2001, p. 336)

―Pay-to-stay fees are charged for existing products to ensure continued presence on the
shelf for some further period.‖
Kelly (1991, p. 187)

―A slotting allowance is a fee paid by a grocery manufacturer to a grocery retailer
at the time of the introduction of a product to the retailer's inventory, ostensibly to
reimburse the retailer for the initial expenses it incurs by adopting the product.‖

Laraviere and Padmanabhan (1997, p. 112) ―Slotting allowances (are) lump sum transfers from manufacturers to retailers for
carrying new products.‖

TABLE 1.1, CONTINUED
Marx and Schaffer (2007, p. 823)

―Upfront payments are fixed fees paid by manufacturers to retailers ostensibly to
obtain access to shelf space, defray upfront costs, and support downstream promotional
activities.‖
―The term is descriptive of when these payments are actually made, that is, at the time the
contract is signed and/or at the beginning of each year if the length of the contract spans
several years.‖
―Slotting allowances belong to this class of payments, as do so-called listing fees, payto-stay fees, and street money.‖
―These allowances are lump-sum, up-front transfer payments from manufacturer
to retailer when the manufacturer launches a new product.‖

Rennhoff (2004, p. 1)

―Merchandising allowances are fees manufacturers pay retailers to encourage
them to allocate certain in-store promotional activities to the manufacturers‘
brand(s).‖

Shaffer (1991, p. 120)

―Slotting allowances, also known as street money or placement allowances, are
fees paid by manufacturers to obtain retailer patronage. They may be cash gifts or
payments in kind, such as cases of free goods.‖

Sudhir and Rao (2006, p. 137)

―Slotting allowances are lump-sum payments by manufacturers to
retailers for stocking new products.‖
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Rao and Mahi (2003, p. 246)

TABLE 1.1, CONTINUED
Sullivan (1997, p. 461)

―Slotting allowances are fixed fees paid to retailers by manufacturers in return for
stocking new products on a trial basis.‖

Wang (2006, p. 68)

―Slotting allowances, also referred to as slotting fees, refer to the fees that
manufacturers pay retailers in order to have their products being carried by the retailers.
These fees include shelf-space fees, display fees, pay-to-stay fees, failure fees, etc.‖

White, Troy, and Gerlich (2000, p. 291)

―…slotting fees typically refer to up-front cash payments to retailers for accepting new
products, while introductory allowances reflect free or discounted orders for new
products.‖
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―The main difference between the two are that slotting fees are negotiated in private, tend
to vary across manufacturers, and are not based on actual purchases, while introductory
allowances are based on purchases and tend to be consistent across manufacturers.‖

RESEARCH GAP
Offering support for the notion that slotting fee occurrences are becoming more
widespread, Wilkie, Desrochers, and Gundlach (2002) find that the practice continued to
grow throughout the 1990‘s. Further, the authors find that this practice has moved
beyond the grocery industry and into other areas of the marketplace such as airports,
internet commerce, and textiles. With no resolution to the opposing schools of thought,
and now a more widespread application of these payments, the debate over this practice
has intensified. In a review of court rulings and case law, Balto (2002) suggests that
interest in slotting allowances and related practices will continue to grow among scholars
as well as public policy makers. However, knowledge gaps remain and scholarly work in
this area is far from over.
One fruitful area of inquiry involves the unintended consequences that result from
these payments.

Beyond discriminatory and exclusionary effects which have legal

implications and questions of fairness and equity within the marketplace which have
ethical implications, there are questions to be answered regarding the effect that these
payments have on the selling process itself. The current research proposal addresses a
portion of this by asking whether or not downstream channel allowances harm a
salesperson‘s ability to persuade a customer through influence methods and/or diminish
the loyalty a customer holds toward the salesperson.

STUDY DESCRIPTION
The current study will explore the effect of customer‘s perceptions of salesperson control
over downstream channel allowances in a business-to-business sales setting. Survey
research will be used as the method in gathering data from a sample of customers.
Secondary data will be collected at the firm-level from marketing managers to complete
the data set. Careful attention will be paid to the sources of the data in an effort to avoid
common method bias (Podsakoff et al 2003). The research model presented in chapter
three will be empirically assessed using well-established methods of analysis. The
hypotheses put forth will be addressed based on the outcome of the model testing
process. Cognitive evaluation theory serves as the guiding framework for this proposal.
However, in the event of unexpected results, other established theoretical perspectives
may be relied upon to provide explanatory value.
10

PROBLEM STATEMENT
The central thesis of this research involves the unintended consequences to the
salesperson resulting from the salesperson‘s perceived control, from the customer‘s
perspective, of channel allowances to gain access to a downstream point of distribution.
Specifically, a lack of control over these payments is hypothesized to undermine a
salesperson‘s influence over the customer and the customer loyalty the salesperson
accrues (i.e., salesperson-owned loyalty).
These relationships are explored from the perspective of cognitive evaluation
theory which suggests that extrinsic rewards for a particular activity result in decreased
intrinsic motivation to engage in the activity. The theoretical rational is that, when the
salesperson is perceived to lack control over these payments, downstream channel
allowances act as an extrinsic source of motivation reducing the customer‘s intrinsic
motivation to focus attention toward an interpersonal relationship with the salesperson.
Thus, the salesperson‘s influence over the customer as well the customer‘s loyalty
toward the salesperson is reduced. In sum, the key variables of concern include the
salesperson‘s perceived control of downstream channel allowances, salesperson
influence, and salesperson-owned loyalty. The next chapter provides a review of the
current literature in relation to each of these variables as well as a review of the
application of cognitive evaluation theory in marketing.

CONTRIBUTIONS
The current dissertation will contribute to multiple research streams with relevancy
across disciplines. First, this research will uncover any hidden effects that downstream
channel payments may be having on key elements of the customer-salesperson
relationship. This will more fully inform managers as to the cost and benefits of using
these payments as part of a distribution strategy.

Second, the conceptualization of

downstream channel allowances will hopefully lessen confusion that surrounds such
payments and offer a more concise approach to future research on the topic. Third, from
a theoretical perspective, this research will apply cognitive evaluation theory in a new
context (i.e., customer-salesperson relationships) and may further strengthen the theory
through empirical testing.
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Fourth, McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani (2006) calls for further research
using salesperson influence in various firms across different industries to further the
generalizability of prior research.

The proposed studies address the issue of

generalizability by employing the salesperson influence construct in relation to channel
allowances in a business-to-business context.

Fifth, Higgins, Judge, & Ferris (2003)

suggests that possible moderators exist between influence tactics and work outcomes.
The current research may serve to further support this idea by showing perceived
salesperson control of channel allowances acting as a suppression mechanism in the
relationship between the explanatory and outcome variables in this study (e.g.,
salesperson influence and salesperson performance). In sum, the value of the current
research is in the acquisition of knowledge in the area of downstream channel allowances
in relation to outcome variables important to both the salesperson and the selling-firm.

12

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
The central thesis of this research involves the unintended consequences to the
salesperson resulting from the customer‘s perception of the salesperson‘s control over
channel allowances used to gain access to a downstream point of distribution.
Specifically, a lack of perceived salesperson control, from the customer‘s point of view,
over such payments is hypothesized to undermine a salesperson‘s influence over the
customer and the customer loyalty the salesperson accrues (i.e., salesperson-owned
loyalty).
These relationships are explored from the perspective of cognitive evaluation
theory which suggests that extrinsic rewards for a particular activity result in decreased
intrinsic motivation to engage in the activity. The theoretical rational is that downstream
channel allowances act as an extrinsic source of motivation when a lack of salesperson
control is perceived by the customer thereby reducing the customer‘s intrinsic motivation
to focus attention toward an interpersonal relationship with the salesperson. Thus, the
salesperson‘s influence over the customer as well the customer‘s loyalty toward the
salesperson (i.e., salesperson-owned loyalty) is reduced. In sum, the key variables of
concern include the customer‘s perception of the salesperson‘s control over downstream
channel allowances, salesperson influence, and salesperson-owned loyalty. This chapter
provides a review of the current literature in relation to each of these variables as well as
a review of the application of cognitive evaluation theory in marketing.

DOWNSTREAM CHANNEL ALLOWANCES
OVERVIEW
Marketing scholars often discover meaningful phenomena to study in attempts to acquire
knowledge regarding marketplace exchanges. One type of exchange occurs between a
selling firm and a buying firm. In a traditional customer-seller exchange a product or
service flows from the seller to the customer while financial consideration flows from the
customer back to the seller. This is perhaps the most common form of exchange studied
in marketing. For example, this type of exchange may take place between a business and
a consumer (business-to-consumer), between two businesses (business-to-business), or
13

between two individuals (peer-to-peer).

In the business-to-business exchange the

practice of sellers paying customers to buy or, from a different perspective, sellers paying
customers in order to sell has become more common. This pay-to-play phenomenon
goes by many names across multiple industries (See Table 2.1).
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TABLE 2.1
Common Terms Used to Describe Downstream Payment Practices1
Author(s)

Publication Outlet

Terminology

Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon (2000)

Journal of Marketing

Display Fees
Failure Fees
Pay-to-Stay Fees
Presentation Fees
Slotting Fees
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Gundlach and Bloom (1998)

Journal of Public Policy & Marketing

Appointment Fees
Maintenance Fees
Stocking Allowances

Jennings, Aalbert, and Happel (2001)

Journal of Law and Commerce

New Product Fees
Stock Buy-Out Fees

Kelly (1991)

Journal of Public Policy & Marketing

Marx and Schaffer (2007)

The RAND Journal of Economics

Advertising Allowances
Upfront Payments

TABLE 2.1, CONTINUED
Rennhoff (2004)

Food Marketing Policy Center

Sullivan (1997)

Journal of Law and Economics

Promotional Allowances

White, Troy, and Gerlich (2000)

Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science

Introductory Allowances

Wilkie, Desrochers, and Gundlach (2002)

Journal of Public Policy & Marketing

Wolburg (2003)

Journal of Consumer Affairs

1

Merchandising Allowances

Street Money
Shelf Access Fees

These are examples of terms used to describe a payment made to a downstream channel member to gain or maintain distribution of a
product or service offering. The list of terms is not exhaustive as other terms are also frequently used to describe this practice.
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Although little attention was paid to slotting allowances and related practices
prior to the mid-1980‘s, the controversial practice of sellers paying customers to gain
access to a downstream distribution point is widespread in modern business (Laraviere
and Padmanabhan 1997).

In fact, Desiraju (2001) estimates that $16-Billion are spent

annually on slotting fees and related payments. Therefore, this research is relevant to
multiple industries, government agencies, and academic disciplines. Specifically, the
literature reviewed here includes work from the fields of marketing, economics, public
policy, and ethics.
In the 20-plus years since Dagnoli and Freeman (1988) made reference to a truce
in the use of slotting fees this practice has only continued to grow. Consumer welfare is
in play; however, the government, at the state and federal level, has been hesitant to
intervene. One reason for this lack of response is the absence of sufficient knowledge to
make decisions and take appropriate action.

Additionally, with little research it is

difficult to predict the ripple effect that may result from these payments, including any
unintended consequences which may result within the selling firm or the marketplace.
Considering how little is known, it is not surprising that there is no agreement as to either
the benefit or detriment of this practice to competitors, consumers, or other stakeholders
within the marketplace. Thus, an unresolved debate exists with opposing views finding
solace in two distinct schools of thought.

SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon (2000) closely examined the different schools of thought
regarding slotting allowances. From the perspective of a marketplace exchange, four
stakeholder groups are affected in some way by slotting fees. These groups include the
selling firm making the payment, the buying firm receiving the payment, competitors of
the selling and buying firms, as well as the consumers buying the product. In general,
there are two schools of thought on slotting allowances and related practices. One is
known as the efficiency school which holds a positive view of the practice while the other
is the market power school which holds a more pessimistic view.
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The Efficiency School
The efficiency school presents several arguments in favor of these fees and allowances;
here are three of the most common as suggested by Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon
(2000). First, in a retail context the fees are beneficial in that they are a highly efficient
way for retailers to allocate scarce shelf space. Second, the fees shift some of the risk
associated with product failure from the customer to the seller. The rational for this
benefit is that the new product failure rate is as high as 90% (Israilevich 2004). This
necessarily exposes the retailer to a large amount of risk without some compensation
arrangement in place between the customer and seller in the event of a product failure.
Thus, these allowances provide a way to accomplish this and distribute the risk more
efficiently across both parties.
Third, the fees allow sellers to signal unobservable characteristics of a product to
customers. For example, willingness to pay a downstream channel allowance indicates
that the seller believes in the product and will support it in the future. Support for this
signaling theory can be found in the literature (e.g., Sullivan 1989, Kelly 1991, and
Lariviere and Padmanabhan 1997). The logic is that in the presence of asymmetric
information favoring the selling-firm, offering a payment for distribution can serve as a
signal to customers that the seller is confident in the products expected performance.
Likewise, customers can charge a fee to sellers as a way of screening out products in
which sellers may be less confident or less willing to support beyond the initial
distribution.

The Market Power School
The market power school has several arguments against these fees and
allowances; here are three of the most common as summarized by Bloom, Gundlach, and
Cannon (2000). First, the fees limit a consumer‘s access to competing products thereby
controlling the individual‘s choice of product.

Along with the forthcoming second

argument, the choice limitation which is imposed by this practice is a key argument
against slotting fees put forth by consumer advocates. Second, the fees increase the price
of the products consumers buy because manufacturers are forced to increase prices to
cover the slotting fees that are required by retail customers. Third, the fees act as an
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anticompetitive mechanism that puts smaller sellers at a disadvantage in that they are
unable to compete with the great financial resources of larger sellers.

This final

argument is the foundational element of the argument heard by the Federal Trade
Commission (2003) prior to the agency‘s investigation into slotting fees and related
practices. However, the conclusion of the FTC report was to refrain from intervening in
this practice which left the government in the position of siding with the efficiency
school by default.
In support of opponents of the market power school, Rao and Mahi (2003) find
the magnitude (i.e., amount) of the slotting fee charged depends on the power of each
exchange partner (e.g., more powerful retailers charge higher fees to less powerful
manufacturers). In this instance, the use of fees has an overall negative impact on
competition in the marketplace. In terms of competition, small sellers are unable to
compete on the same level as large sellers when it comes to paying the fees charged by
retailers. From the consumer‘s perspective, these fees have a real financial cost to sellers
which must accounted for the wholesale price of the product which will ultimately affect
the retail price.

MARKETING LITERATURE
Within the marketing literature, there is a minimal amount of work on downstream
channel allowances (i.e., slotting fees and related practices). The literature which does
exist is generally found within the contexts of new product introduction, competition,
pricing, and consumer welfare. Each of these research areas are reviewed here while the
economics literature and another popular domain for this research, public policy, is
presented subsequently.

New Product Introduction
The application of downstream channel allowances to the context of new product
development is a natural fit because these allowances are often used as a mechanism to
gain initial distribution of a product (e.g., slotting fees). When used in this way these
payments between channel members may supplement the efforts of the salesperson (e.g.,
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make it easier for a salesperson to reach a quota), replace portions of the selling function
(e.g., reduce the number of sales calls necessary to achieve distribution of a new
product), or undermine relational elements which are important in the customersalesperson relationship (e.g., reduce influence and displace loyalty).
When considering the many fine points involved in specific exchanges between
customers and sellers, one can see evidence of why there is no clear consensus regarding
the use of downstream channel allowances. For example, Laraviere and Padmanabhan
(1997) find that slotting fees are not necessary in the presence of low retailer costs. In
this situation selling firms can signal demand for a new product through wholesale price
alone because the retailer has little concern over the cost associated with the particular
transaction. That is, beyond the price being charged by the selling firm, cost within the
distribution system is not a significant issue for retailers when putting new products on
the shelf. Therefore, manufacturers can adjust the asking price for the product to signal
unobservable attributes to the customer and avoid the use of downstream payments
altogether.
In another example; White, Troy, and Gerlich (2000) find that retailers charge
introductory allowances and slotting fees in an effort to minimize the perceived risk and
cost associated with carrying a new product. In the previous example, Laraviere and
Padmanabhan (1997) seem to only consider the cost of placing a product in distribution
with little, if any, consideration for the risk and subsequent cost of product failure.
White, Troy, and Gerlich (2000) suggest that retailers actually charge these fees in
association with ―new products‖. The question remains as to why retailers would charge
these fees for products which are already in distribution and have proven to be successful
(e.g., pay-to-stay fees).
Adopting a different perspective, regarding the use of slotting allowances offered
by manufacturers, as opposed to fees charged by retailers, Desiraju (2001) finds that
when these allowances are used by sellers they should be offered on a brand-by-brand
basis as opposed to being offered as a uniform allowance across all new product
introductions. The brand-by-brand method of applying these payments allows the seller
to address transaction specific elements such as costs and risks related to each new
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product. This method is offered as a more efficient way for sellers to apply downstream
channel allowances in an effort to gain distribution of new products.

Competition and Pricing
As knowledge of downstream channel allowance practices has grown and interest in this
phenomenon from marketing scholars has increased, more attention is being paid to the
effects of these payments on competition and pricing. Specifically, Wolburg (2003)
provides support for the market power perspective by presenting a case study in which
less powerful manufacturers are in fact disadvantaged through the use of shelf-access
fees paid by more powerful manufacturers. In effect, the larger manufacturer has the
ability to acquire and exert control over scarce shelf space which is akin to buying real
estate in that there is a limit to its availability. Smaller sellers are left to compete for
what is left over which may only be the the least desirable retail shelf positions (e.g.,
bottom shelf facings).
In contrast, Sudhir and Rao (2006) argue that slotting allowances and fees are
efficiency enhancing, in part, because they provide a mechanism to lessen retail
competition leading to a wider distribution of manufacturer‘s products. The logic is that
sellers are able to use payments in a selective way and pick-and-choose distribution
points in the marketplace essentially reducing competitive effort to a simple financial
payment. Further, Kuksov and Pazgal (2007) find that slotting allowances occur more
frequently and in greater magnitude in the presence of stronger retail competition, a more
powerful retailer, and higher retailer costs.

Consumer Welfare
With the growing movement toward transformational consumer research (see Mick
2006) and the clear benefit to be found by focusing research effort toward the well-being
of the consumer, some scholars have suggested a relevant tie between downstream
channel payment practices and consumer welfare. Specifically, Israilevich (2004) studies
the impact of ‗side payments‘ made by manufacturers on supermarket product
assortment.

The author examined slotting allowances and pay-to-stay fees in the

21

supermarket industry. A key finding from this work is that supermarkets stock some
products which are not profitable. However, manufacturers pay slotting allowances for
these products thus subsidizing them and ensuring their continued distribution regardless
of the retailer‘s profitability from the sale of the product. Israilevich (2004) also suggests
that these products would be discontinued in the absence of slotting allowances therefore
banning this practice would be detrimental to consumers. Absent the ability of sellers to
subsidize the distribution of their less profitable products, consumer choice would be
negatively affected. In opposition to this argument, Rennhoff (2004) finds that in the
absence of merchandising allowances, manufacturers decrease wholesale prices in an
effort to compete for shelf space which subsequently leads to lower retail prices. Thus,
the presence of allowances has a deleterious effect on consumer welfare. This is yet
another example of the unresolved nature of the discussion over the use of downstream
channel allowances and such related payment practices.

ECONOMICS
New Product Introduction
Complementing the mixed results found in the new product marketing literature, Sullivan
(1997) studies retail trends of the frequency of new product introductions and retailer
profits finding support for the market power school of thought. Specifically, Sullivan
(1997) suggests that slotting fees allow manufacturers to employ a signaling strategy
when making new product offerings to customers. Retailers benefit from slotting fees as
well in that the fees provide a mechanism for screening and eliminating less desirable
product offerings which leads to a decrease in the consumer‘s search effort. Therefore,
Sulliavn (1997) concludes that slotting allowances are pro-competitive and enhance
consumer welfare.

Exclusionary Effects
Marx and Schaffer (2007) suggest when multiple retailers require upfront payments from
manufacturers; these manufacturers opt to distribute products through the dominant
retailer at the exclusion of smaller retailers. This, in effect, means that these payments
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mitigate competition among retailers because smaller retailers are unable to justify
charging higher fees based on key drivers such as sales volume. The larger retailer likely
to offer the manufacturer an outlet which will lead to higher sales of their products; thus,
these retailers can justify charging a higher fee for distribution. In spite of the higher fee
that must be paid, Marx and Schaffer (2007) find that manufacturers will opt for the
larger retailer due to the expected benefits. However, this action leads to higher retail
prices and decreased product selection across retail competitors, both of which harm
consumer welfare.

Competition and Pricing
Shaffer (1991) puts forth a model which shows that in the presence of slotting
allowances, competition among manufacturers intensifies and retailers realize greater
profits; while at the same time, consumers pay higher prices.

Therefore, slotting

allowances are found to be beneficial to retailers but harmful to both manufacturers and
consumers. In an earlier effort to explore slotting allowances, Toto (1990) finds that
slotting allowances have efficiency enhancing effects through improved allocation of
retail shelf space. In an effort to go beyond the immediate and obvious effects of slotting
allowances, Wang (2006) investigates the ripple-effect that slotting allowances have
within the marketplace. In particular, Wang (2006) finds that larger retailers charge
slotting allowances which leads manufacturers to increase wholesale prices to the
marketplace in an effort to cover these fees. Thus, smaller retailers are forced to pay
these higher wholesale prices but lack the market power to levee slotting fees against the
manufacturer. The anticompetitive result is smaller retailers, in comparison to larger
retailers, experience lower profit margins and market share.

PUBLIC POLICY
Antitrust Issues
In an effort to understand the public policy implications of slotting fees and related
practices, Cannon and Bloom (1991) conclude that the practice of charging slotting fees
is increasing. However, the authors establish no basis for any harmful effects of these

23

fees to either competition or consumers. As a possible explanation for the increase in the
occurrence of slotting fees, Kelly (1991) suggests that a rise in product innovation
increased the demand for retail shelf space resulting in the use of these fees as a way to
allocate shelf space. Further, Kelly (1991) suggests that in the absence of support for any
harmful effects of slotting fees, signaling and risk-shifting may be reasonable
justifications for using these fees. In a more recent effort; Bone, Francis, and Riley
(2006) find that slotting fees are now used across multiple industries although the
application of these payments varies based on industry norms. Additionally, the authors
find no support for the efficiency enhancing effects of slotting fees. However, support is
found in favor of the market power perspective which takes a negative perspective on
such fees and allowances. In particular, large manufacturers were more likely to pay
slotting fees while larger retailers were more likely to demand these fees.

Product Discrimination
In a review of the legal issues related to the increasing use of slotting fees in the late1980‘s and early-1990‘s, Aalberts and Judd (1991) suggest that regulatory action may be
forthcoming due to the discriminatory nature of this practice. However, the Bureau of
Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) did subsequently ban the practice; while the
Federal Trade Commission, which is the governing body for products outside of the
domain of the BATF, reviewed the use of slotting fees and related practices and took no
action (see FTC 2003). The contradictory position held by the BATF and the FTC was
explored by Gundlach and Bloom (1998). A possible rational was offered to justify the
opposite views of the FTC and the BATF. Specifically, the authors suggest that the
BATF ruling which banned the use of downstream payments in the distribution and sale
of alcohol is grounded in case law which came about shortly after prohibition. The FTC
is unable to justify the same regulatory behavior because there is no such case law on
which to draw from and the post-prohibition law cited by the BATF does not apply to
non-alcohol related products.
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General Policy Issues
Offering support for the notion that slotting fee occurrences are becoming more
widespread, Wilkie, Desrochers, and Gundlach (2002) find that the practice continued to
grow throughout the 1990‘s. Further, the authors find that this practice has moved
beyond the grocery industry and into other areas of the marketplace such as airports,
internet commerce, and textiles. With no resolution to the opposing schools of thought,
and now a more widespread application of these payments, the debate over this practice
has intensified. In a review of court rulings and case law, Balto (2002) suggests that
interest in slotting allowances and related practices will continue to grow among scholars
as well as public policy makers.
With careful attention to the ethical considerations surrounding slotting
allowances and related practices, Aalberts and Jennings (1999) suggest that the current
application of slotting fees is unethical on the grounds that ―market access is controlled
by something other than quality or demand‖ (p. 214). In addition, the authors suggest
that this practice violates Fieser‘s (1996) fairness principle; that is, businesses are denied
the chance to compete in the marketplace without retailers reviewing the product. The
application of downstream channel allowances by sellers, as well as the charging of these
fees by customers, offers a rich area of inquiry for scholars with an interest in business
ethics. The current review of academic research uncovered a significant deficiency in the
literature regarding the study of ethics in relation to slotting fees and other types of
downstream payments made in the marketplace. Scholars have a great deal of work
remaining in this area. Refer to table 2.2 below for a summary of the key findings from
academic research across multiple contexts and disciplines.
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TABLE 2.2
Key Studies of Downstream Channel Allowance Practices
Context & Rational

Finding(s)

Laraviere and Padmanabhan (1997)

New Product
Signaling Theory

Slotting fees are not needed in the presence of low
retailer cost as manufacturers can signal demand of new
products through wholesale price alone.

Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon (2000)

Schools of Thought
Efficiency Theory
Market Power Theory

Mixed results: Retailers view slotting allowances as
efficiency enhancing and manufacturers view the
practice as an abuse of market power.

White, Troy, and Gerlich (2000)

New Product
Shifting
Cost-Sharing

Retailers use introductory allowances and slotting Riskfees to minimize perceived risk and cost associated
with carrying a new product.

Desiraju (2001)

New Product
Asymmetric Information

Regardless of information asymmetry,
manufacturer allowances should be offered on a
brand-by-brand basis as opposed to offering a uniform
allowance.

Rao and Mahi (2003)

New Product
Signaling Theory
Market Power

In support of the market power school, the
magnitude of the slotting fee charged depends on
the power of each exchange partner (e.g., more
powerful retailers charge higher fees to less powerful
manufacturers).
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Author(s)
MARKETING LITERATURE

TABLE 2.2, CONTINUED
Competition
Antitrust
Power

Case study which indicates that less powerful
manufacturers are disadvantaged through the use of Market
shelf-access fees paid by more powerful manufacturers.

Israilevich (2004)

Product Assortment
Consumer Welfare

Instead of discontinuing non-profitable products,
retailers charge fees to subsidize the cost of
continuing to carry the products. Thus, eliminating such
fees would diminish product assortment and have a
detrimental effect on consumer welfare.

Rennhoff (2004)

Pricing
Competition
Consumer Welfare

In the absence of merchandising allowances,
manufacturers decrease wholesale prices to
compete for shelf space which leads to lower retail
prices. Thus, the presence of allowances has a deleterious
effect on consumer welfare.

Gundlach (2005)

Competition
Exclusionary Effects

A review of the Federal Trade Commission‘s
framework on the use of slotting fees and related
practices indicates that these fees can exhibit both procompetitive and anti-competitive effects depending on the
circumstances.

Sudhir and Rao (2006)

New Product
Competition
Efficiency Enhancing

Slotting allowances are efficiency enhancing (e.g.,
retail space allocation), shift risk of new product Signaling
failure from retailer to manufacturer, reduce information
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Wolburg (2003)

TABLE 2.2, CONTINUED
asymmetry through signaling by manufacturers, and lessen
retail competition leading to wider distribution of
manufacturer‘s products.
Kuksov and Pazgal (2007)

Competition
Market Power

Slotting allowances occur more frequently and in
greater magnitude in the presence of greater retail
competition, a more powerful retailer, and higher retailer
costs.

Toto (1990)

Competition
Efficiency Enhancing

Slotting allowances have efficiency enhancing
effects through improved allocation of retail shelf
space.

Shaffer (1991)

Pricing
Competition
Consumer Welfare

In the presence of slotting allowances, competition
among manufacturers intensifies and retailers
realize greater profits while consumers pay higher
prices. Therefore, slotting allowances are harmful to
manufacturers and consumers.

Sullivan (1997)

New Products
Signaling
Screening
Consumer Welfare

Slotting allowances allow manufacturers to employ
signaling and retailers to screen products which minimizes
consumer‘s search effort. Thus, slotting allowances are
pro-competitive and enhance consumer welfare.

ECONOMICS LITERATURE
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TABLE 2.2, CONTINUED
Competition
Market Power

Larger retailers charge slotting allowances which
leads to an increase in manufacturer‘s wholesale
price to the marketplace. Smaller retailers are forced to pay
higher wholesale prices but lack the power to levee slotting
allowances. The result is smaller retailers experience lower
profit margins and market share than larger retailers.

Marx and Schaffer (2007)

Competition
Exclusionary Effects
Consumer Welfare

When multiple retailers require upfront payments
from manufacturers, these manufacturers opt to
distribute products through the dominant retailer at
the exclusion of smaller retailers. This leads to
higher prices and decreased product selection, both of
which harm consumers.

Aalberts and Judd (1991)

Legal Review
Price Discrimination

Reviews legal issues related the increasing use of
slotting fees in the late-1980‘s and early-1990‘s.
The authors suggest that regulatory action may be
forthcoming due to the discriminatory nature of these fees.

Cannon and Bloom (1991)

New Product
Antitrust Issues

Although the authors conclude that the practice of
charging slotting fees is increasing as of the late1980‘s, they establish no basis for any harmful effects of
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Wang (2006)

PUBLIC POLICY

TABLE 2.2, CONTINUED
these fees to either competition or consumers. They call for
further research by marketing scholars on this phenomenon.
Antitrust Issues
Signaling
Risk-Shifting

The author suggests that a rise in product
innovation has increased demand for retail shelf
space resulting in the materialization of slotting
fees as a mechanism for shelf space allocation. The
author also suggests that in the absence of support
for any harmful effects of slotting fees, signaling and riskshifting may be reasonable explanations
for the use of these fees.

Gundlach and Bloom (1998)

Retail Alcohol Sales
Policy Differences

The authors explore the different legal precedence
which lead the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms to ban the use of slotting fees in the retail sale of
alcohol while the Federal Trade Commission has not taken
action in other segments of the retail marketplace. Note: It
is prohibited by the BATF for suppliers of alcoholic
beverages to pay slotting fees to retailers even though
suppliers of other products competing for the same retail
space are permitted
to offer these payments.

Balto (2002)

Legal Review

In relation to slotting allowances, the author
provides a review of recent court rulings, case law,
and the Federal Trade Commission report in this
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Kelly (1991)

TABLE 2.2, CONTINUED
practice. The concludes that the interest in slotting
allowances from academia as well as public policy
makers will continue to grow.

Public Policy
Channel Member Views

The authors find that the practice continued its
rapid growth in the 1980‘s all through the decade of
the 1990‘s. The practice of slotting fees not only
continues to grow in the retail grocery industry but
is now spreading to other industries (e.g., airports,
internet commerce, textiles, etc). Analysis of
survey data gathered from manufacturers
wholesalers, and retailers indicate that the issue of
slotting fees remains controversial.

Bone, France, and Riley (2006)

Public Policy
Efficiency Theory
Market Power Theory

Slotting fees are used across multiple industries
although the application of this practice varies
based on industry norms. No support is found for the
efficiency enhancing effects of slotting fees however
support was found in favor of the market power hypothesis
as larger manufacturers were more likely to pay slotting
fees and larger retailers
were more likely to demand these fees.
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Wilkie, Desrochers, and Gundlach (2002)

TABLE 2.2, CONTINUED
ETHICS
Aalberts and Jennings (1999)

Competition,
Exclusionary Effects

The authors suggest that the current application of
slotting fees is unethical on the grounds that
―market access is controlled by something other than
quality or demand‖ (p. 214). In addition, this practice
violates Fieser‘s (1996) fairness principle (i.e., businesses
are denied the chance to compete in the marketplace
without retailers reviewing the product).
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SALESPERSON INFLUENCE
One of the responsibilities of a salesperson is to ensure that a customer makes a decision
which is both appropriate for the buying organization while at the same time furthering
the objectives of the selling organization. Multiple strategies and techniques exist that
are intended to assist the successful salesperson in accomplishing this goal in an
efficacious manner (e.g., adaptive selling, consultative selling, and relationship building).
Without doubt, much progress has been made in the acquisition of knowledge related to
the field of personal selling in the forty years since Frederick Webster (1968) commented
that ―one of the most frequently asked and incompletely answered questions in
marketing‖ pertains to understanding what makes a ―successful‖ salesperson.

The

current research takes an opposing view by asking what makes an unsuccessful
salesperson. Specifically, may a sales manager or selling-firm engage in activities which
appear to be beneficial but are unknowingly undermine the effectiveness of the
salesperson?
Scholars have dedicated many years of thoughtful effort to the pursuit of
answering the questions most relevant to personal selling. One example of such work is
the inquiry into the role that influence tactics play in the salesperson-customer interaction
(Spiro & Perreault 1979; Frazier & Summers 1984; Kholi & Zaltman 1988; Crosby,
Evans, & Cowles 1990; Brown 1990; McFarland 2003; Borders 2006; McFarland,
Challagalla, & Shervani 2006). Spiro and Perreault (1979) suggest that ―the concept of
influence implies an effort to move the attitudes or behavior of a target person (the
customer) in a pre-specified direction‖ (p. 453). This would seem to be the main task
salespeople face in convincing prospects that a certain product or service is best suited,
above all others, for the needs of the buying firm. Refer to table 2-3 below for a
summary of influence methods used by salespeople in an attempt to gain compliance
from a customer.
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TABLE 2.3
Prior Research Constructs of Salesperson Influence Methods
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Influence Strategy

Description

Expert1

The salesperson discusses specific information about the offering and how it may
be useful to the customer‘s firm.

Impression Management1

The salesperson attempts to maintain control over the views and opinions of the
salesperson held by the customer.

Information Exchange 2

The salesperson discusses general issues and procedures to try to alter the
customer‘s general perceptions without stating a request.

Ingratiation1,3

The salesperson engages in behaviors aimed at improving the salesperson‘s
interpersonal attractiveness and improving rapport with the customer to gain compliance.

Inspiration Appeals3

The salesperson makes statements intended to appeal to the customer‘s values
and ideals thereby motivating the customer to make decisions which may not be in the
customer‘s personal interest.

Legitimate1

The salesperson attempts to gain compliance by leveraging the positive opinions
held by the customer (e.g., reputation, experience) toward the selling firm.

Promises2

The salesperson promises the customer a reward if the customer complies with a
request.

TABLE 2.3, CONTINUED
Recommendations2

The salesperson predicts that the customer will be more profitable if the customer
follows the salesperson‘s suggestions.

Referent1

The salesperson attempts to gain compliance by using the personal relationship
that the salesperson has with the customer.

Threats2

The source threatens the target with a future penalty if the target does not comply
with a request.
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Source: 1Spiro and Perreault (1979)
2
Payan and McFarland (2005)
3
McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani (2006)

Drawing partly on the work of French and Raven, and in combination with
interviews conducted with salespeople across multiple industries, Spiro & Perreault
(1979) focus research around five influence methods used by salespeople; expert,
impression management, ingratiation, legitimate, and referent influence methods.
Consistent with other scholars, the authors explicate these methods based on openversus close-personal strategies (Brown 1990; Falbo 1977; Spiro and Perreault 1979; and
Weitz 1981). An open strategy is one in which the salesperson‘s objectives are apparent
to the customer and there is no hidden agenda. A closed-strategy is just the opposite; the
objectives of the salesperson remain unknown to the customer.
Of the five influence methods offered by Spiro and Perreault (1979); expert,
legitimate, and referent influence methods are considered open-strategies while
ingratiation and impression management are closed-strategies. Although prior research
has considered open influence strategies in selling, Spiro and Perreault (1979) took the
initial look at the two closed-strategies mentioned. Salespeople are advised to use
caution when using any influence tactic because even methods used by salespeople with
no hidden objectives, but which is perceived by the customer as such, may likely lead to
undesirable outcomes for the selling firm (Spiro and Perreault 1979 and Brown 1990).
In addition, Spiro and Perreault (1979) advanced the understanding of influence
in selling by considering the ways in which salespeople use multiple strategies based on
the sales situation (i.e., influence-strategy mixes). In this work, influence strategies and
the way they are combined by salespeople were examined based a set of situational
factors including both salesperson and customer characteristics, the interaction between
the salesperson and customer, and select marketplace factors. As a result, Spiro and
Perreault (1979) find that salesperson influence attempts increase in the presence of
higher customer-involvement in the sales call. Further, they find that the more important
a salesperson perceives the sale to be, the more likely s/he will employ influence
methods. Of note, Spiro and Perreault (1979) find that when a salesperson is faced with
a difficult situation (e.g., a difficult customer or a challenging negotiation), closed
influence strategies (i.e., ingratiation and impression management) are more likely to be
used. The authors point out that this exposes the selling-firm to certain risks in the event
that the customer discovers the presence of hidden objectives in the salesperson‘s
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influence attempts. Customers may find this to be manipulative and thus form a negative
opinion of the salesperson and the selling-firm.
In a later effort, Frazier & Summers (1984) investigate interfirm influence
methods based on a taxonomy of six influence strategies; information exchange,
legalistic pleas, promises, recommendations, requests, and threats. They find that the
information exchange method is used most frequently by salespeople. This strategy was
used more than requests which were used second most and more than recommendations
by a two-to-one margin. One explanation offered by the authors is that in the presence of
frequent information exchange it becomes decreasingly necessary for a salesperson to
make recommendations.

Although over time an information exchange strategy can

require greater expenditure of selling resources (e.g., time), by providing information
which will shape the prospect‘s opinion in favor of the selling-firm‘s offering, a
recommendation is often not needed (Frazier and Summers 1984).

In terms of

frequency, the influence methods of promises, threats, and legalistic pleas ranked in this
order. Additionally, a positive correlation was found between information exchange and
request which the authors suggest is an indication that these two strategies are
complimentary in nature.
Noteworthy and of special interest to channel‘s researchers, a negative correlation
was found between the desirable variable of interfirm agreement and the frequency of
requests (Frazier and Summers 1984). Frazier and Summers (1984) point out that this is
contradictory to findings regarding the use of promises in social psychology. Upon
closer review of the analysis of the data in this study, the logic for such a finding
becomes more apparent. Promises and threats were highly correlated with each other
which is an indication that both strategies share something in common. That is, both
strategies involve either the giving, or the holding back from giving, of something that
the prospect desires (Frazier and Summers 1984). In sum, Frazier and Summers (1984)
suggest that salespeople are best advised to focus primarily on using information
exchange in conjunction with requests, use recommendations sparingly and only when
necessary, and avoid using promises, threats, or legalistic pleas.
Along these same lines; Venkatesh, Kohli, and Zaltman (1995) provide a study of
influence strategies in an inter-organizational context. The authors use a similar set of
influence strategies from prior research (i.e., information exchange, legalistic pleas,
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promises, recommendations, requests, and threats) and categorize each strategy based on
coercive intensity, task orientation, and instrumentality.

In support of Frazier and

Summers (1984), Venkatesh, Kohli, and Zaltman (1995) find that information exchange,
requests and recommendations are the most frequently used while promises, threats and
legalistic pleas are used far less often.
In yet another example of how one may delineate and categorize influence
strategies, McFarland (2003) provides a dichotomy of influence methods based on the
concepts of persuasion and coercion (see also Barron and Staten 1995). Persuasive
influence methods aim to alter the customer‘s attitude toward the offering leading to the
realization that the salesperson‘s product is in fact the best choice available. Such
influence methods include information exchange, requests, and recommendations (Payan
and McFarland 2005). Coercive influence methods aim to gain compliance through
reward or punishment and include such influence strategies as promises, threats, and
legalistic pleas. McFarland (2003) finds that when a salesperson engages in coercive
influence strategies s/he subsequently experiences an increased level of both physical and
mental stress. So, why do salespeople continue use these methods of influence (e.g.,
Barron and Staten 1995)? There may be a power imbalance between the buying and
selling firm which favors the seller or the salesperson may be under intense pressure to
perform which leads the salesperson to identify coercive influence tactics as the optimal
strategy (McFarland 2003).
In support of prior research, Payan and McFarland (2005) investigate the use of
influence strategies in gaining compliance form channel members. Similar to other
scholars,

the

authors

use

the

tactics

of

information

exchange,

promises,

recommendations, requests, and threats. However, the influence method of rationality is
added and subsequently found to be the most effective in gaining channel member
compliance. The authors describe the rationality strategy as ―…(when a salesperson)
presents reasons accompanied with supportive information for a target to comply with a
request‖ (Payan and McFarland 2005, p.68). Further, Payan and McFarland (2005) find
that non-coercive influence strategies are more effective at gaining channel member
compliance than the coercive tactics such as promises and threats.
While adopting a different perspective of the customer-salesperson dyad and
drawing on the work of other scholars such as Dwyer, Frazier, McFarland, and Cialdini;
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Borders (2006) puts forth a conceptual framework of influence methods referred to as
―Customer Initiated Influence Tactics‖ or CIIT. This taxonomy consists of ingratiation,
requests, promises, and threats. Although offering nothing new to the list of influence
methods discussed elsewhere in this review, the idea that these influence methods can be
used by the customer as a compliance gaining attempt over the salesperson does provide
a rare insight and an intriguing direction for further inquiry. Certainly, there is much to
be gained by studying the strategies and behaviors that firm-level customers use in
dealing with industrial salespeople.
Previous research has also explored the relationship between the influence tactics
used by salespeople and the customer orientations of prospects which results in two key
findings (McFarland, Challagalla, & Shervani 2006). First, although customers are quite
complex, salespeople can use a particular influence tactic which, based on the orientation
of the customer, will lead to a more effective means of persuasion. Second, salespeople
studied in the work by McFarland et al (2006) were able to identify which influence
tactics were most appropriate based on the customer‘s orientation. Taken together, these
findings indicate that disparate customers can be persuaded and salespeople can be
trained to select the appropriate influence tactic(s) to persuade these customers. In
related research on customer orientation, Williams and Spiro (1985) find that assessing
customer orientation based on the three categories of task-, self-, and interactionorientation is ―significant‖ in terms of the amount of variance explained in a sales
exchange. McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani (2006) built upon this previous work in
showing that customer orientation is a worthwhile consideration in making a choice of
influence tactic.
Customers with a task orientation ―focus on the task at hand‖, prefer that sales
interactions be ―as efficient as possible‖, and are ―highly goal oriented‖ (McFarland,
Challagalla, and Shervani 2006; p. 115). While information exchange is an influence
tactic that can be used effectively across all three customer orientations, a task oriented
customer will also respond most positively to the influence tactic of making
recommendations (McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani 2006).
A customer with a self orientation cares more about ―what [he/she has] to say‖ as
opposed to what the seller might say and attempts to ―impress‖ the salesperson with
his/her own knowledge and experience (McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani 2006; p.
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115). The authors find that ingratiation is an effective choice of influence tactic to use
when dealing with a self-oriented customer.

In addition to ingratiation, the use of

promises is a suggested method of influence to use with such a customer (McFarland,
Challagalla, and Shervani 2006).
Customers with an interaction orientation view salesperson encounters as an
opportunity to socialize with the seller. This type of customer appears to be interested in
getting to know the salesperson beyond what might be expected in a typical business
relationship (McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani 2006). The influence methods of
ingratiation and the use of inspirational appeals are the two recommended tactics when
dealing with an interaction oriented customer (McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani
2006).
However, many questions remain unanswered in this regard. The literature is
lacking in a thorough exploration of the potential mechanisms that may undermine the
salesperson‘s ability to influence customers. For instance, when two salespeople use the
influence tactic of ingratiation, from the perspective of the customer, the salesperson may
be viewed as a provider of information, a close ally in business, or a consultant in the
process of making important decisions. In contrast, a salesperson may also be viewed as
a consumer of time, a spy for the competition, and someone to be avoided until needed.
Ironically, when considering two salespeople working for the same firm and selling the
identical product line, one could be viewed by the customer in terms of positive
characteristics, while the other in terms of negative ones. The difference between these
salespeople may simply be each one‘s ability to choose the appropriate influence tactic
and to use it correctly. This review uncovers a need for further research in understanding
why salespeople experience different levels of success when using the same influence
method.
Also as guidance for future research; McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani
(2006) provide a taxonomy of influence tactics that are most often used by salespeople.
This set of six influence methods is drawn from previous research covered in this review
and includes information exchange, recommendations, threats, promises, ingratiation,
and inspirational appeals. These methods combine to form what is referred to as
―salesperson influence tactics‖ (SITs).
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SALESPERSON INFLUENCE TAXONOMY

Information Exchange
A salesperson engages in the tactic of information exchange without the expectation of a
commitment from the customer and without providing any recommendations regarding a
course of action that a customer might take (McFarland, Challagalla, & Shervani 2006).
During this process of information exchange, the salesperson provides relevant
information to the customer and may also ask questions of the customer; however, the
salesperson avoids making specific attempts at influencing the customer toward having a
positive view of the product being offered (McFarland,Challagalla, & Shervani 2006).

Recommendations
Recommendations are made when the salesperson leads a customer to believe that
―following a specific course of action‖ is in the best interests of the customer and the
buying organization (Venkatesh, Kohli, & Zaltman 1995). Add a page number for the
quote. Generally, a salesperson may make recommendations that are solely in the best
interests of the buying-firm or solely in the interests of the selling-firm. However, an
enlightened salesperson may find it best to offer suggestions that strike a balance
between the interests of both the buying- and selling-firm.

Threats
As one might imagine, the decision to use threats as a method of influence must be
chosen only after much consideration by a salesperson. Once a threat has been made, one
may not rescind its effects so easily. Boyle and Dwyer (1995) consider a threat to be an
act of coercion in that a salesperson suggests that a penalty will result at some point in
the future in the event that the customer does not agree to follow the salesperson‘s
request. While this influence method is included in the SIT taxonomy, it is nevertheless
used sparingly.

Promises
While a threat may suggest that a negative action is forthcoming if a salesperson‘s
request is not granted, a promise is an indication that a positive occurrence should be
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expected when a salesperson‘s request is met (Venkatesh, Kohli, & Zaltman 1995). It is
conceivable that a synergistic effect may result from the use of both promises and threats
in relation to the same requests. However, it is just as possible that any goodwill
achieved by making a promise will be erased in light of the negativity surrounding a
threat.

Ingratiation
Ingratiation has been defined as ―an attempt by individuals to increase their attractiveness
in the eyes of others so as to influence those others‘ behavior‖ (Cooper 2005 add the
page number). The importance of ingratiation as a path to persuasion must not be
underestimated. Frenzen and Davis (1990) find that a strong social bond between the
customer and seller is more likely to lead to a product purchase decision than is the
customer‘s preference for the actual product. One might take this empirical finding as an
example of support for the idea that all things being equal, people tend to buy from those
whom they like. Ingratiation is a pathway to liking that ultimately may lead to
commitment.

Inspirational Appeal

An inspirational appeal is often used as a way to encourage a customer to make a
decision that may not be based on the best interests of one specific party (Yukl & Tracey
1992). For example, a seller may suggest that a customer should make a decision that,
although may not be the optimal choice for the buying organization, is in the best
interests of the environment and the surrounding community. To accomplish such an
outcome, a seller must ―appeal to [the customer‘s] values, ideals, or aspirations‖ (Yukl &
Tracey 1992). See table 2-4 for a summary of the SITs taxonomy to be used in the
current research.
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TABLE 2.4
Salesperson Influence Tactics Taxonomy and Definitions
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Influence Strategy

Definition

Information Exchange 1

The source discusses general issues and procedures to try to alter the target‘s
general perceptions without stating a request.

Recommendations1

The source predicts that the target will be more profitable if the target follows the
source‘s suggestions.

Threats1

The source threatens the target with a future penalty if the target does not comply
with a request.

Promises1

The source promises the target a reward if the target complies with a request.

Ingratiation2

The source engages in behaviors aimed at improving the sources interpersonal
attractiveness and improving rapport with the target.

Inspiration Appeals2

The source makes statements intended to appeal to the target‘s values and ideals
thereby motivating the target to make decisions which may not be in the target‘s personal
interest.

Source: 1Payan and McFarland (2005)
2
Mcfarland, Challagalla, and Shervani (2006)

SALESPERSON-OWNED LOYALTY AND FIRM-OWNED LOYALTY

In a customer-seller relationship, a customer may be expected to hold a certain level of
loyalty to the selling firm regardless of whether this level is high, low, or somewhere in
between.

Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp (2007) hypothesize that some of this

customer loyalty may be directed toward the firm (i.e., firm-owned loyalty) while a
portion of it may be directed toward a particular salesperson (i.e., salesperson-owned
loyalty). Both the object and degree of loyalty is of importance to the salesperson as well
as the selling firm.
For example, in the event that a salesperson chooses to leave an organization,
then the value of this individual salesperson‘s performance is lost. However, in terms of
customer loyalty, the value lost will ultimately depend on which of these two targets (i.e.,
the salesperson or the selling firm) the customer is loyal to and the degree of loyalty that
the customer holds toward each. At one extreme, if the customer is loyal to the selling
firm exclusively, then no real value is lost in terms of customer loyalty if the salesperson
chooses to leave. However, if salesperson-owned loyalty is high the firm stands to lose a
great deal more, particularly if the salesperson exits in favor of a competitor (Palmatier,
Scheer, and Steenkamp 2007).
This presents an intriguing dilemma for the selling organization. How desirable is
it to maximize or minimize salesperson-owned loyalty? The firm may be best served by
focusing first on the customer‘s commitment toward the firm, second toward the product,
and finally toward the salesperson. However, this is a challenging task in that customers
may tend to relate best to an individual (i.e., a salesperson), while it is difficult to
personify a product or an entity (i.e., the firm). Thus, an argument could be made that
developing firm-owned loyalty may be an important indicator of a salesperson‘s level of
performance. In any case, both salesperson-owned loyalty and firm-owned loyalty are
relatively new constructs in the marketing literature which are considered in this
dissertation.
Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp (2007) find that firm-owned loyalty positively
affects a customer‘s willingness to pay a price premium for the selling firm‘s offering.
Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp (2007) find that salesperson-owned loyalty positively
affects a customer‘s willingness to pay a price premium, sales growth to the customer,
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selling effectiveness (e.g., sales to this customer outperformed the selling firm‘s overall
sales performance). The authors caution that any risk associated with the acquisition of
salesperson-owned loyalty must be considered in relation to the expected benefit to the
firm of this form of loyalty from a customer.

COGNITIVE EVALUATION THEORY
OVERVIEW
Cognitive evaluation theory (CET) is a theory of motivation which puts forth the idea
that there are two sources of motivation; intrinsic and extrinsic (Deci, Koestner, and
Ryan 1999). Intrinsic motivation flows from the enjoyment or interest of an activity. A
person who is intrinsically motivated engages in the activity because of the satisfaction it
gives them.

Extrinsic motivation flows from some source outside of the activity.

Although there is some debate regarding the impact of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic
motivation, there is a strong argument that extrinsic rewards undermine the positive
effects of intrinsic motivation (e.g., Bernstein 1990). Specifically, when one receives an
incentive (e.g., cash) to engage in an activity, the level of intrinsic motivation to perform
the task diminishes. In relation to the current study, as customers and buying firms are
paid via downstream channel allowances to provide access for the selling firm‘s offering,
does the customer‘s intrinsic motivation to build and maintain loyalty to the salesperson
and/or selling firm diminish?

Further, what impact may a decrease in intrinsic

motivation on the part of the customer affect the salesperson‘s ability to exert influence
over the customer?

PRIOR RESEARCH APPLICATIONS
The application of cognitive evaluation theory in marketing is not new (see
Anderson and Oliver 1987; Challagalla and Shervani 1996; Christen, Iyer, and Soberman
2006; Dahl and Moreau 2007; Kivetz 2003; Kohli, Shervani, and Challagalla 1998; and
Van Trijp, Hoyer, and Inman 1996). In a conceptual piece on salesforce control systems,
Anderson and Oliver (1987) use cognitive evaluation theory as one of four separate
theoretical perspectives in understanding behavior-based versus outcome-based control
systems. Additional perspectives considered in this research include agency theory,
organization theory, and transaction cost analysis. Anderson and Oliver (1987) suggest
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that in large part these theories predict that a behavior-based control system is preferable
in the presence of environmental uncertainty. Specific to cognitive evaluation theory, the
authors suggest that, even though no one system is ideal across all occasions, a behaviorbased control system is most suited for maximal intrinsic motivation.
Using the perspective of cognitive evaluation theory in conjunction with other
theories of motivation, Challagalla and Shervani (1996) advance the work of Anderson
and Oliver (1987) by further delineating behavior-based control into the categories of
activity and capability control. While capability control focuses on the development of a
person‘s skills and abilities, activity control focuses on providing a person with specific
behaviors which s/he is expected to perform, as well as overseeing and guiding such
behavior through the use of rewards and punishments (Challagalla and Shervani 1996).
A key finding from this research is that sales managers are most likely to see an increase
in a salesperson‘s level of intrinsic motivation when using a capability control approach
versus activity control. Challagalla and Shervani (1996) provide the rational for this
finding in that prior research (see Deci and Ryan 1985) suggests ―…information that is
aimed at improving competencies is likely to increase intrinsic motivation‖ (p. 99).
In an investigation of consumer choice behavior; Van Trijp, Hoyer, and Inman
(1996) use the elements of cognitive evaluation theory to further distinguish variety
seeking behaviors. Specifically, the authors find that variety seeking behavior among
consumers is not uniform across all marketplace situations (e.g., product characteristics).
That is, intrinsic motivation leads to ―true‖ variety seeking behavior while extrinsic
motivation leads to ―derived‖ variety seeking behavior. In applying these findings to
marketing strategy; Van Trijp, Hoyer, and Inman (1996) suggests that when an offering
is similar to competing offerings, requires low involvement, and is purchased with high
frequency; a strategy aimed at the consumers intrinsic motivation will be most effective
at encouraging brand switching (e.g., a call to action for the sake of variety). On the
other hand, when these characteristics are not present in the offering then a more
effective strategy would be extrinsic motivation (e.g., a sale).
In a study mapping the effects of supervisor orientation onto the learning
orientation of salespeople Kohli, Shervani, and Challagalla (1998) employ cognitive
evaluation theory in connecting the capability oriented manager to the salesperson‘s
learning orientation. Specifically, the authors suggest that a capability oriented manager
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plays the role of ―coach‖ to the salesforce thus leading to individual salespeople with
higher levels of intrinsic motivation. Further empirical analysis offers support for this
rational in that a supervisor‘s capability orientation was found to be positively related to
the salesperson‘s learning orientation (Kohli, Shervani, and Challagalla 1998).
Kivetz (2003) applies cognitive evaluation theory to the study of the effort that
one is willing to put forth in relation to the uncertainty of a reward and the significance
of the reward. Not surprisingly, the authors found that the more a person finds the
activity to be enjoyable (i.e., intrinsically motivating) the more likely s/he is to forgo a
sure but less significant reward in exchange for a larger but uncertain reward which has
to be earned through the effort put forth. Similarly, on the grounds of cognitive
evaluation theory (i.e., intrinsic motivation); Christen, Iyer, and Soberman (2006)
suggest that an individual‘s actual job performance has an effect on his/her overall job
satisfaction. In support of this, the authors find, by distinguishing a manager‘s effort
from his/her performance, that a positive job performance leads to higher intrinsic
motivation (i.e., enjoyment of effort) which results in greater job satisfaction.
In an application of cognitive evaluation theory to consumer behavior, Dahl and
Moreau (2007) study the effects of competence and autonomy on ―consumer‘s creative
experiences‖. The authors find that an individual with greater skill to perform a given
task (i.e., competence) and the freedom to complete the task in a self-determining manner
(i.e., autonomy) will find the task to be more enjoyable (i.e., intrinsically motivating). In
relation to the current research, the decline in intrinsic motivation may flow from a threat
to the customer‘s autonomy caused by the use of downstream payments. The customer
may feel that s/he is now engaging in a relationship with the salesperson because s/he
―has‖ to as opposed to ―wanting‖ to invest the time.

RESEARCH GAP
To date, scholars have examined slotting fees and related practices across
contexts. This work includes the ongoing debate over the channel effects of such fees
(e.g., Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon 2000; Marx and Schaffer 2007), the relevance of
these fees to new product development (e.g., Desai 2000; Desiraju 2001; Rao and Mahi
2003; Richards and Patterson 2004; Sudhir and Rao 2006), and the case of these
payments from a public policy perspective (e.g., Bone, France, and Riley 2006; Wilkie,
47

Desrochers, and Gundlach 2002). However, empirical research in this area remains
scarce.
The work which has been put forth tends to focus on the case of powerful
retailers requiring manufacturers to pay fees to gain distribution of a new product. Little
effort has been put into investigating the incidence of manufacturers wanting to pay fees
as a way to gain product distribution, develop brands, build market share, grow top line
revenue, and improve bottom line results. Additionally, very little, if anything, is known
about the unintended consequences of sellers paying such fees and allowances.
Specifically, do these downstream channel allowances undermine the salesperson‘s
influence over the customer and harm his/her ability to acquire customer loyalty?
Thus, I propose to investigate the use of these payments by selling firms in terms
of both occurrence and magnitude. Relying on the guidance of cognitive evaluation
theory, I set forth hypotheses which posit an undermining effect of two key relational
elements between the customer and salesperson (i.e., salesperson influence and customer
loyalty). Based on prior research, additional main effect hypotheses are stated and
combine with the moderator hypotheses to form the overall research model. This model
is presented in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH MODEL
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter a research model is presented which has been developed from the idea that
low perceived salesperson control of channel allowances, from the customer‘s point of
view, may have the unintended consequences of undermining relational elements
important to the salesperson (i.e., salesperson influence and customer loyalty).
Antecedents to salesperson influence (see the SITs taxonomy in chapter 2). Therefore,
these antecedents are not included in the model or the data collection and analysis phase
of the study.
The research model depicted in figure 3-1 below indicates several anticipated
relationships among the variables. Two of the key main effect relationships involve
variables related to influence and loyalty. In regard to influence, salesperson influence is
expected to be positively related to salesperson performance which is the expected to
have a positive relationship with selling-firm performance (i.e., sales volume). In terms
of loyalty, the customer investments engaged in by the salesperson (i.e., frequency of
sales calls) and selling firm (i.e., amount of allowances to be paid) are expected to be
positively related to salesperson-owned loyalty.
In terms of moderation, low perceived salesperson control of channel allowances
is hypothesized to diminish the positive effect of salesperson influence on salesperson
performance.
relationship.

Conversely, high perceived control is expected to enhance this
Further, low perceived salesperson control of these payments is

hypothesized to reduce the positive effect of customer investments on salesperson-owned
loyalty while high control is expected to strengthen this positive relationship. All of
these undermining and enhancing effects may be hidden from the selling firm due to the
short-term positive impact on selling firm performance from simply paying channel
allowances. At the firm level, these payments may appear to be working very well while
the hidden, unintended consequences result in the salesperson‘s position, in relation to
the customer, being compromised. These relationships are illustrated in the structural
model below.
Additional effects are anticipated among the loyalty variables, outcome variables,
and the customer‘s perception of the salesperson‘s control of channel allowances.
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FIGURE 3.1
OVERALL RESEARCH MODEL
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Specifically, and consistent with prior research, salesperson-owned loyalty is
expected to have a positive direct effect on firm-owned loyalty (Palmatier, Scheer, and
Steenkamp 2007). Salesperson-owned loyalty is hypothesized to have a positive direct
effect on salesperson performance while firm-owned loyalty has a positive direct effect
on the selling firm performance. Note that all of the variables in the model have either a
positive direct effect or a positive indirect effect on the selling firm performance. Thus,
this provides the rational as to why the negative or positive effects of perceived
salesperson control of channel allowances on the variables related to the salesperson are
not obvious to firm-level managers. This provides the motivation for the current research
which is to explore the unintended consequences of the undermining effect that low
perceived salesperson control of such payments may have on the customer-salesperson
relationship.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Salesperson Influence
From the perspective of the customer, the salesperson may be viewed as a provider of
information, a close ally in business, or a consultant in the process of making important
decisions. In contrast, a salesperson may also be viewed as a consumer of time, a spy for
the competition, and someone to be avoided until needed. Ironically, when considering
two salespeople working for the same firm and selling the identical product line, one
could be viewed by the customer in terms of positive characteristics, while the other in
terms of negative ones. The difference between these salespeople may simply be each
one‘s ability to choose the appropriate influence tactic and to use it correctly.
The antecedents of salesperson influence have been thoroughly investigated by
scholars (Boyle and Dwyer 1995; Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; Frazier and Summers
1984; Gundlach and Cadotte 1994; and Venkatesh, Kohli, and Zaltman 1995).
Additionally, several other marketing scholars have used the salesperson influence
variable in studying interpersonal influence across various context (see Kohli 1989;
Venkatesh, Kohli, and Zaltman 1995; Dawes, Lee, and Dowling 1998; and McFarland
2003). However McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani (2006) provide the most recent
empirically tested taxonomy of influence tactics that are most often used by salespeople.
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This set of six distinct influence methods includes information exchange,
recommendations, threats, promises, ingratiation, and inspirational appeals. As presented
in chapter 2, each of these methods combine to form what is referred to as ―salesperson
influence tactics‖ (SITs).

Customer Investments
Customer investments are investments of time (i.e., sales calls) made by the
salesperson and money (i.e., channel allowances) made by the selling firm in relation to a
particular customer. It is assumed for the current study that both of these investments are
of benefit to the customer and thus should have a positive impact on customer loyalty.
Customer investments are intended to be both relationship enhancing (e.g., via customer
service through sales calls) and performance enhancing (e.g., via channel allowance
payments). Customer investments as operationalized in the current study are similar in
nature to the ‗relationship enhancing activities‘ put forth by Palmatier, Scheer, and
Steenkamp (2007). That is, the relationship enhancing activities scale is essentially a
measure of time and monetary inputs by the salesperson with benefits flowing to the
customer. However, this measure of relationship enhancing activities is a self-report
measure and some element of secondary data was more desirable in the current study.
Beyond that, it is suggested here, and consistent with Palmatier et al‘s (2007) finding
when assessing relationship enhancing activities, that customer investments have a
positive direct effect on salesperson-owned loyalty.

Salesperson- and Firm-Owned Loyalty
Prior to Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp (2007), one shortcoming of customer
loyalty measures was that these measures did not distinguish between customer loyalties
toward a selling firm versus customer loyalties toward a salesperson. The risk that
selling firm‘s were exposed to in the event that a salesperson left the organization were
not fully captured under these previous measures. However, Palmatier et al (2007) take a
significant step toward delineating these two forms of loyalty by assessing to whom the
customer‘s loyalty belongs.

Customer loyalty flowing to the salesperson is termed

‗salesperson-owned loyalty‘ and is expected to have a positive spill-over effect onto
customer loyalty toward the firm (i.e., firm-owned loyalty). Validated maeasures exist
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for both forms of customer loyalty and will be adapted to fit the context of the current
study.

OUTCOME VARIABLES
Salesperson Performance with the Customer and Selling Firm Performance
Performance is determined by a salesperson‘s ability to meet or exceed the expectations
of sales managers as well as the attainment of other relevant organizational objectives.
Brown and Peterson (1993) suggest that sales performance is an end in itself. However,
the proposed research model takes this notion a step further by linking salesperson
performance with specific selling firm performance. As opposed to viewing salesperson
performance as ―good‖ or ―bad‖, I suggest that a salesperson‘s performance should be
considered in relation to other variables beyond the salesperson‘s control; for example,
the selling firm‘s decision to offer perceived salesperson control of channel allowances.
Salespeople must are also expected to achieve the desired level of performance in
a dynamic environment by altering sales strategies and approaches depending on the
situation (Weitz, Sujan, and Sujan 1986). In terms of improving performance, some
recommendations by Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987) are offered to increase customer
satisfaction. Specifically, these authors suggest that a salesperson can play a positive
role between the organization and the buying firm by serving as an effective
communicator for both parties. However, to the extent that actions taken by the selling
firm are undermining the salesperson‘s ability to manage the customer relationship, the
salesperson‘s role as communicator and persuader may become unnecessarily difficult.
In regard to the current study, the salesperson‘s individual performance will be
assessed from the customer‘s perspective using an adapted version of a previously
validated measure (Sujan, Weitz, & Kumar 1994).

In addition to salesperson

performance, a key outcome variable at the firm level is considered here, that is, sales
volume. Specifically, sales growth with a particular customer is anticipated to benefit
from higher levels of salesperson- and firm-owned loyalty.

Sales growth with a

customer is measured through year-over-year sales volume growth the time period of the
study.
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MODERATOR VARIABLE
Perceived Salesperson Control of Channel Allowances
In a traditional buyer-seller exchange a product or service flows from the seller to the
customer while financial consideration flows from the customer back to the seller. This
is a common type of exchange studied by marketing scholars. This type of exchange
may take place between a business and a consumer or between two businesses. In the
business-to-business exchange the practice of sellers paying customers to buy, or from a
different perspective, sellers paying customers in order to sell, has become increasingly
common. This pay-to-play phenomenon goes by many names across multiple industries.
Specific to the marketing literature, this practice is referred to as slotting fees, display
fees, failure fees, pay-to-stay fees, presentation fees, and merchandising allowances
among others.

However, there is a fundamental problem with using multiple terms,

often in a generic way, to describe all such pay-to-play practices.
First, the most common of these terms, slotting fee, is somewhat outdated when
used generically in the marketplace. The term ―slotting fee‖ was originally used in
reference to manufacturers paying for ‗slots‘ in the warehouse of a distributor. There
were costs associated with adding products in the warehouse so a slotting fee was
charged to the manufacturer as a way of transferring those costs. Today, the term
slotting fee is used to describe many different arrangements such as paying for shelf
space in a retail store or paying for product placement on a website. For further insight
into to lack of clarity surrounding the term slotting fee or allowance, refer to table 3-2
below
Second, the term has become outdated from a legal perspective. For example,
when the Federal Trade Commission (2003) questioned retail customers regarding the
practice of slotting fees, customers frequently stated that their company did not charge
nor except slotting fees. While technically true, many of these companies did extract
payments from sellers in other ways such as promotional and advertising allowances,
failure fees, or charge-backs. While these practices are not technically ―slotting fees‖,
they are effectively the same. That is, financial consideration being paid by the seller to
the customer in exchange for access to a downstream distribution channel.
Third, these fees and allowances are not solely being charged by customers to
sellers. In fact, manufacturing firms frequently offer payment, in these many forms, as a
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way to gain access within a channel of distribution. For example, a consumer goods
manufacturer may offer a merchandising allowance to a retailer in exchange for
distribution or additional space in the retailer‘s store.

Similarly, an appliance

manufacturer may offer payment, in some form, to a home builder in exchange for
placement of the manufacturer‘s appliances in model homes. The possible forms of
payment are virtually endless and the exchange partners too numerous to count when
attempting to investigate this pervasive phenomenon.
Thus, in an effort to combine all of these various payments into one concept and
to allow for concise study, I propose the conceptualization of ‗downstream channel
allowances‘ to describe the process of financial consideration flowing from a seller to a
customer with the outcome of gaining access to a distribution channel controlled by a
downstream channel partner (e.g., the customer).
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TABLE 3.2
Downstream Channel Allowance Practices - Terminology and Definitions1,2
Definition

Appointment Fees

Fees for making new product presentation appointment (Gundlach and Bloom 1998, p.
174).

Display Fees

Fees paid for special merchandising and display of products (Bloom, Gundlach, and
Cannon 2000, p. 93).

Failure Fees

Fees paid when a product does not meet expected goals (Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon
2000, p. 93).

Introductory Allowance

Free product or monetary discount related to the agreed upon purchase of a new
product. Usually tied to a purchase and remain largely consistent across customer-seller
exchanges for a given product (e.g., White et al 2000; Cannon and Bloom 1991).

Maintenance Fees

Fees to keep a new product on store shelves or maintain slow-moving products or all
products in general (Gundlach and Bloom 1998, p. 174).

Merchandising Allowance

A fee that manufacturers pay retailers to encourage them to allocate certain in-store
promotional activities to the manufacturer‘s brand(s) (Rennhoff 2004, p. 1).

Pay-to-Stay Fees

Fees paid to continue stocking and displaying a product (Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon
2000, p. 93).

Presentation Fees

Fees paid for the privilege of making a sales presentation (Bloom, Gundlach, and
Cannon 2000, p. 93).
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Common Term

TABLE 3.2, CONTINUED
Shelf Access Fees

A variety of payments made by sellers to retailers including slotting fees, pay-to-stay
fees, as well as payments made in an effort to exclude rivals or place them in a poor position on
the retail shelf (e.g., Wolburg 2003).

Slotting Fees

Up-front payments of cash, promotional dollars, or merchandise to obtain shelf space for
A product (Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon 2000, p. 93).

Stocking Allowances

Fees for price cuts made on existing products to make room for a new product (Gundlach
And Bloom 1998, p. 174).

Upfront Payments

Fixed fees paid by manufacturers to retailers ostensibly to obtain access to shelf space,
defray upfront costs, and support downstream promotional activities (Marx and Schaffer 2007,
p. 823).
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1

The terms ―Fee(s)‖ and ―Allowance(s)‖ are used interchangeably in the literature.

2

Other terms used in the literature to refer to this practice include, but are not limited to, the following: Advertising Allowance,
Charge-Back, Key Money, Marketing Premium, Negative Allowances, New Product Fee, Promotional Allowance, Stock Buy-Out
Fees, Street Money, and Write-Down.

CONTROL VARIABLES
The current study seeks to understand the impact, based on the customer‘s perceptions,
of the salesperson‘s control over channel allowances. Given this goal, it is important that
the customer providing survey data is familiar with both the salesperson in question and
the channel allowances paid by the selling firm. Thus, in order to more fully investigate
the relationships between the variables in this study, it is important to control for two key
variables, customer familiarity with the salesperson and the allowances paid by the
selling firm. This important because the customer is the primary source of data regarding
relational aspects of both the salesperson and channel allowances. Therefore, a basic
level of familiarity is required. Both control variables will be assessed with single item
survey measures. In addition, both of these items will serve as informant checks when
screening data provided by survey respondents.

HYPOTHESES
SALESPERSON INFLUENCE AND PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES
McFarland, Challagalla, Shervani (2006) explore the use of salesperson influence tactics
in relation to three distinct customer orientations; task, self, and interaction orientation.
However, the authors do not tie the use of influence strategies based on the SITs
taxonomy to actual salesperson performance. Considering the essential nature of
‗performance‘ in the selling profession this leaves an important knowledge gap to be
filled. Further, little, if any, empirical testing has been conducted which links the use of
salesperson influence methods to salesperson performance with the customer. Therefore,
the following hypothesis is stated.

H1a: Salesperson influence positively affects salesperson performance
with the customer.

H1b: Salesperson performance positively affects selling firm performance.
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SALESPERSON-OWNED LOYALTY AND PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES

Prior research demonstrated support for the positive effect of salesperson-owned loyalty,
as derived from relationship enhancing activities, on firm-owned loyalty and selling firm
financial outcomes as well as a direct positive effect of firm-owned loyalty on selling
firm financial outcomes (Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp 2007). The current research
seeks to provide further support for these findings and advance knowledge by empirically
assessing the affect of customer investments on salesperson-owned loyalty as well the
affect of salesperson-owned loyalty on salesperson performance with the customer and
firm-owned loyalty. Further, it is suggested here that firm-owned loyalty has a direct
positive effect on selling firm performance. Although the focus of this study is on the
customer-salesperson relationship, the effects of salesperson-owned loyalty may be
combined with customer loyalty to the firm if firm-owned loyalty were excluded.
Therefore, the following hypotheses are put forth.

H2a: Customer Investments positively affect salesperson-owned loyalty.
H2b: Salesperson-owned loyalty positively affects salesperson
performance with the customer.

H2c: Salesperson-owned loyalty positively affects firm-owned loyalty.
H2d: Firm-owned loyalty positively affects selling firm performance.

PERCEIVED SALESPERSON CONTROL OF CHANNEL ALLOWANCES AS A MODERATOR
It is argued here that a salesperson‘s actual influence on a customer is not determined
solely by the effort of the salesperson. Rather, the salesperson‘s influence is determined
by a combination of potential factors (e.g., individual and situational). In relation to the
current investigation, a salesperson‘s influence is determined by the salesperson‘s effort
to influence the customer (e.g., providing recommendations) and the customer‘s
perceptions (i.e., perceived salesperson control of channel allowances). It is suggested
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here that the customer‘s perceptions regarding the salesperson‘s control over allowances
moderates the relationship between customer investments and salesperson-owned loyalty
and salesperson influence and the salesperson‘s performance with the customer (see
figure 3.2 below). In support of this approach, prior research on salesperson influence
has studied the comingling of individual resources and behaviors in determining the
impact of a salesperson‘s influence (e.g., Kohli 1989). Thus, the following hypotheses
are put forth.

H3a: High (Low) perceived salesperson control of channel allowances
enhances (diminishes) the positive effect of customer investments on
salesperson- owned loyalty.

H3b: High (Low) perceived salesperson control of channel allowances
enhances (diminishes) the positive effect of salesperson influence on
salesperson performance with the customer.
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FIGURE 3.2
Theoretical Model of Moderation Hypotheses

61

SUMMARY
In this chapter, a research model is presented which has been derived from the
hypothesized effects and is proposed with the aim of empirically testing the relationships
among multiple variables of interest in a business-to-business selling context.

The

primary contribution of this research is to uncover the hidden, unintended consequences
to the health of the customer-salesperson relationship in the presence of channel
allowances. Additional contributions of this research include connecting the influence
and loyalty variables directly to salesperson performance and illustrating how these
positive effects contribute to salesperson- and firm-level performance outcomes.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
The assessment of the proposed structural model and relationships among the constructs
of interest will require survey data gathered at the customer level and secondary data
provided at the firm level. A number of main effects will be tested along with a series of
moderation effects. In regard to the moderation analysis, the customer‘s perception of
the salesperson‘s control over channel allowances is hypothesized to diminish the
positive effect of salesperson influence on salesperson performance as well as the
positive effect of customer investments on salesperson-owned loyalty.

In terms of

mediation effects, the positive effect of salesperson influence on selling-firm financial
outcomes expected to operate through salesperson performance. Along these same lines,
salesperson-owned loyalty operates through salesperson performance and firm-owned
loyalty to positively impact the firm-level outcome variables. The research setting and
design are discussed next.

RESEARCH SETTING
The focus of the current study is the customer-seller relationship and the role of channel
allowances as a mechanism that affects the anticipated benefits of salesperson influence
and customer investments. Therefore, the required sample will consist of data from
customers and marketing managers. The research effort will require a sufficient sample
of matched customer-salesperson dyads.
For the purposes of this dissertation, it would be preferable to use industrial
salespeople (i.e., business-to-business) as opposed to retail salespeople (i.e., business-toconsumer). The reason for this preference is that retail salespeople are often engaged in
one-time sales exchanges in which the desire to build a long-term relationship is
decidedly one-sided; that is, the seller would enjoy establishing a relationship to
encourage future sales while the customer most likely will seek the best offer when the
need arises in the future as opposed to relying on an established relationship.
Conversely, in the context of industrial sales, the customer is making a purchase decision
based on the need to maximize profit for the buying organization. Thus, building a longterm relationship with a salesperson may be equally important, if not more important, to
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the customer in comparison to the seller. Another reason that a sample of industrial
salespeople is most appropriate for this study is that channel allowances occur more
frequently, if not exclusively, in a business-to-business context. For a more accurate
assessment of variance, both the presence and absence of these payments across the total
sample would be desirable.

RESEARCH DESIGN
Following the recommendation of Podsakoff et al. (2003), measurement of the research
variables will be administered in an effort to minimize the negative consequences of
common method bias. Specifically, Podsakoff et al. (2003) recommend collecting the
type of data that is required in the current study from multiple sources. With this in
mind, the variables in the research model will be collected from different sources. For
example, a measure of salesperson influence will be completed by the customer while a
measure of selling firm performance will be provided by the marketing manager. Based
on the purpose of this study, it is not recommended to collect all variables in the model
from different sources.

For example, when assessing how much influence the

salesperson has on the customer and how much loyalty the customer has toward the
salesperson, and in the absence of representative secondary data, the most accurate
source of this data would be the customer. With only two options available as potential
sources of data (i.e., salesperson and customer), the customer is likely to provide more
objective and accurate information.

In addition, a focal point of this study is the

customer‘s perceptions. Hence, it would make little sense to ask the salesperson
regarding these issues.
In sum, data for salesperson influence, salesperson performance with the
customer, and firm-owned loyalty will be provided by the customer. Secondary data
regarding customer investments and selling firm performance will be provided by the
marketing manager.

See table 4-1 for a summary of research variables and data

collection methods.
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TABLE 4.1
Research Variables and Data Collection Method
Measurement
Variable
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Customer
Survey Data

Firm Level
Secondary Data

Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances

X

X

Salesperson Influence

X

Customer Investments

X

Salesperson-Owned Loyalty

X

Firm-Owned Loyalty

X

Salesperson Performance w/ Customer

X

Selling-Firm Performance
Sales Growth to the Customer
Channel allowance
Occurrence
Magnitude

X

X

X

X
X

MEASUREMENT OF RESEARCH VARIABLES
PERCEIVED SALESPERSON CONTROL OF ALLOWANCES
The customer‘s perceptions of the salesperson‘s control over channel allowances are of
particular interest in this study. However, the literature lacks any measure that will allow
this variable to be properly assessed. Therefore, a scale will have to be developed which
accurately represents this key construct. Specifically, a measure will be developed,
which is to be completed from the customer‘s perspective, of how much control the
salesperson has on the allowances the selling-firm pays. A number of sources (e.g., Churchill 1979, Gerbing and Anderson 1988) provide guidance to aid the researcher in
the scale development process. Based on recommendations from such prior research, the
scale development process will include the following steps; item generation based on the
conceptualization of the construct, an assessment of content and face validity through the
use of expert judging, and reliability, dimensionality, and further validity testing.
While the current study is primarily interested in the customer‘s perceptions of
the salesperson‘s control of these allowances, data regarding the occurrence (i.e.,
frequency) and magnitude (i.e., amount) of the payments will be gathered as well. The
variable representing the perceived salesperson control over channel allowances acts
solely as a moderator variable in this research model. Data will be collected from the
customer and the selling-firm (to serve as a cross-check on customer data) regarding the
occurrence of these payments and from the selling firm regarding the magnitude. Refer
to table 4-2 below for a summary of the measures to be used in the current study

SALESPERSON INFLUENCE
Salesperson influence is the actual influence which the salesperson holds over the
customer‘s decision making and has been shown to flow from the use of the salesperson
influence tactics (McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani 2006). An adapted measure of
manifest influence is provided by McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani (2006) and is
further adapted here as ‗salesperson influence‘.

This validated measure will be

completed by the customer in an effort to assess the level of influence the salesperson
possesses within the customer-salesperson dyad.
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TABLE 4.2
Model Variables – Measures to be Developed/Adapted, Method, and Source*
Variable & Measure

Method

Source
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Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances (PSCA)
Secondary Data
Selling Firm
1. My (firm) salesperson controls the allowances Pepsi provides to us.
2. My (firm) salesperson has the ability to increase or decrease the allowances we receive.
3. I typically negotiate allowances from (firm) with my salesperson.
4. My (firm) salesperson has the authority to make decisions regarding our allowances.
5. My (firm) salesperson controls the amount of the allowances we receive.
6. My (firm) salesperson controls the frequency with which our allowances are paid.
7. (Firm) empowers its salespeople to control the allowances we receive from them.
8. My (firm) salesperson rarely brings his/her manager to meeting when allowances are discussed.
9. My (firm) salesperson rarely has to seek approval when making decisions regarding our allowances.
10. All matters relating to our (firm) allowances are handled by our salesperson.

Salesperson Influencea (SI)
Survey Data
1. How much weight did you give to the salesperson‘s opinions before buying?
2. To what extent did the salesperson‘s involvement influence your choices?
3. How much impact did the salesperson have on your purchase decisions?
4. To what extent did you go along with the salesperson‘s suggestions?
5. How much weight did you give the salesperson‘s statements in making you purchase decisions?
6. To what extent did your decisions reflect the salesperson‘s influence?
7. To what extent did the salesperson influence the criteria used for making purchase decisions?

Customer

TABLE 4.2, CONTINUED
Customer Investments
Survey and Secondary Data
1. Average number of sales calls made on a given customer per week.
2. The channel allowance payment amount on a per case basis.

Customer/Selling Firm

Salesperson-Owned Loyaltyb
Survey Data
Customer
1. If my salesperson moved to a new firm with similar products, I would likely shift some of my purchases to this
salesperson‘s new firm.
2. I would do less business with this firm in the next few years, if my salesperson changed.
3. I would be less loyal to this firm, if my salesperson moved to a new firm.
4. I feel greater loyalty toward my salesperson than to this firm.
5. I would recommend this salesperson to my coworkers even if this salesperson changed firms.
6. If this salesperson changed companies, I would recommend this salesperson to others in my company.
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Firm-Owned Loyaltyb
Survey Data
1. For my next purchase, I will consider this firm as my first choice.
2. I will do more business with this firm in the next few years than I do right now.
3. All else being equal, I plan to buy from this firm in the future.
4. I say positive things about this firm to my coworkers.
5. I would recommend this firm to someone seeking my advice.
6. I encourage friends and coworkers to do business with this firm.

Customer

Salesperson Performance with Customerc
Survey Data
1. Contributing to your company's acquiring a good market share.
2. Selling high profit-margin products.

Customer

TABLE 4.2, CONTINUED
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Generating a high level of dollar sales.
Quickly generating sales of new company products.
Identifying major accounts in your territory and selling to them.
Exceeding sales targets.
Assisting your sales supervisor meet his or her goals.

Selling Firm Performance
1. Sales growth to customer

Secondary Data

Control Variables / Key Informant Checks
Survey Data
1. How familiar are you with your Pepsi sales representative?
2. How familiar are you with the allowances you receive from Pepsi?
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*See Appendix for the finalized survey instrument
a
McFarland, Challagalla, & Shervani (2006)
b
Palmatier, Scheer, & Steenkamp (2007)
c
Sujan, Weitz, & Kumar (1994)

Selling Firm

Customer

CUSTOMER INVESTMENTS
Customer investments combine two key inputs on the part of the salesperson and selling
firm with the customer, that is, time and money. These investments are operationalized
here in the form of the number of sales calls a salesperson makes on a customer over a
given period of time and the amount channel allowances paid to a customer on a per case
basis. Such investments are expected to engender loyalty from the customer which, in
the context of this study, is referred to as salesperson-owned loyalty (Palmatier, Scheer,
and Steenkamp 2007). Customer investments will measured using customer level survey
data (i.e., average number of sales calls per week) and firm level secondary data (i.e.,
channel allowance amount per case).

SALESPERSON- AND FIRM-OWNED LOYALTY
A customer may have a certain level of loyalty to the salesperson, the selling firm, or a
combination of both. A selling firm may assume that all loyalty from a customer is
directed at the firm and allow no room for customer loyalty directed exclusively at the
salesperson.

In some instances, a portion of the customer‘s loyalty is directed to

salesperson but is combined with other loyalties and considered as overall loyalty to the
selling firm. Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp (2007) refer to this mistaken allocation
of customer loyalty as ‗illusory loyalty‘. This is customer loyalty that does not exist for
the benefit of the firm and in fact exposes the firm to risk in the event that the salesperson
leaves the company. Therefore, when a salesperson exits an organization, the value of
that individual‘s performance is lost; however, in terms of customer loyalty, all may not
be lost. Some of the accrued value (e.g., goodwill toward the selling firm and/or its
products) may remain. Thus, two separate measures used to assess a customer‘s loyalty
toward the salesperson and the firm have been developed by Palmatier, Scheer, and
Steenkamp (2007). These instruments will be used in the current study as well.

SALESPERSON AND SELLING FIRM PERFORMANCE
In previous sales research, salesperson performance has been assessed by using criteria
such as sales volume, dollar sales, evaluations, and self-report measures (Krishnan,
Netemeyer, and Boles, 2002). Rentz et. al. (2002) posits that selling skills; including
technical skills, salesmanship skills, and interpersonal skills; are important when
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attempting to predict salesperson performance as well. Thus, for the proposed study,
individual salesperson performance will be measured at the customer level using an
adapted scale based on a measure which has been previously validated by Sujan, Weitz,
& Kumar (1994). In addition to salesperson performance, sales growth to the customer
(i.e., selling firm performance) will be assessed using secondary data provided by the
marketing manager.

CONTROL VARIABLES

In order to more fully investigate the relationships between the variables in this study, it
is important to control for two key variables, customer familiarity with the salesperson
and the allowances paid by the selling firm. This important because the customer is the
primary source of data regarding relational aspects of both the salesperson and channel
allowances. Therefore, a basic level of familiarity is required. Both control variables
will be assessed with single items on the survey. In addition, both of these items will be
used as key informant checks to screen survey respondents. It would be ill-advised to
include customers in the final data pool who may lack familiarity with either the
salesperson or the channel allowances. A customer cannot be expected to respond with
any

confidence

or

accuracy

to

items
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assessing

an

unfamiliar

area.

DATA COLLECTION AND PREPARATION

Primary data will be collected at the customer level using an electronic survey developed
specifically for this study. Surveys will be sent via email to customers in a Word
document designed to allow for customers to respond by selecting a response without
altering the rest of the document in any way. Surveys may be returned by email, fax, or
mail as full contact information will be provided with the survey. Survey data will be
coded and entered into an excel spreadsheet and then imported into SPSS 12.0 and
AMOS 7.0 for analysis.
Secondary data will be provided by the selling firm and, if necessary, converted
to an Excel spreadsheet. This data will then be added to the survey data and analyzed
using SPSS 12.0 and AMOS 7.0 as needed. Missing data will coded as ‗blank‘ and
replaced with the mean barring the occurrence of excessive missing data. For example, if
an entire page of the survey or the majority of a measure is left blank then that customer
will be removed from the sample.

All scaled variables will be mean centered to

minimize the potential effects of multicollinearity.

MEASUREMENT VALIDATION

The scale development process for the measure of perceived salesperson control will be
treated differently from the validate measures used in this study. The items for the
perceived control scale will be subjected to principal components analysis using
SPSS12.0 with a minimum eigenvalue of 1.00 used to identify the number of
components. The construct is expected to be unidimensional with factor loadings in
excess of .60 or greater (Hair et al 1998). The purified scale resulting from this process
will be assessed using confirmatory factor analysis in AMOS 12.0 and checked for
model fit. Once fit is determined to be acceptable, the latent construct along with the
remaining indicators will be included in the overall measurement model.
The psychometric properties (i.e., convergent validity, discriminant validity, and
reliability) of the measurement variables and item indicators from previously validate
scales will be assessed by performing confirmatory factor analysis on the variancecovariance matrix. Model fit will be determined by reporting the appropriate statistics;
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χ2, df, p- value, CFI, GFI, and RMSEA (Byrne 1998). Internal consistency of each
measure will be assessed and Cronbach‘s alpha will be reported (Cronbach 1951).

DATA ANALYSIS

Assuming all measures are found to be both valid and reliable, the individual direct
relationships hypothesized in the research model will be tested by initially using multiple
regression in SPSS 12.0 accounting for the appropriate control variables.

The

relationships which are established with significance, and those nearing significance, will
be included in the overall research model and tested using AMOS 7.0. The moderator
hypotheses will be tested next.

Of primary interest in this analysis will be the

hypothesized moderation effect of perceived salesperson control of allowances on two
key relationships (see Figure 4.1a and Figure 4.1b).
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FIGURE 4.1A
Perceived Salesperson Control of Channel Allowance Moderation of the
Positive Effect of Salesperson Influence on Salesperson Performance
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FIGURE 4.1B
Perceived Salesperson Control of Channel Allowance Moderation of the
Positive Effect of Customer investments on Salesperson-Owned Loyalty
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Multigroup analysis, a method of testing for moderation within structural models
is commonly used in prior research (e.g., Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp 2007). This
method requires that a high and low group be established for the moderator of interest by
using a median split of the sample. For the current analysis, the multigroup method will
be used for model testing in AMOS 7.0. First, the two groups resulting from the median
spilt must be specificied. In this instance, there will be a ‗high control‘ and a ‗low
control‘ group. Then, using a chi-sqaure difference test two models are compared. For
testing of the first model all hypothesized paths are constrained to be equal across both
groups. The resulting chi-squae is then compare with a second model in which the path
hypothesized to be moderated is unconstrained and allowed to vary across the two
groups. Support for moderation is indicated if the chi-square of the unconstrained model
is significantly less than the chi-square for the constrained model and the effect is found
to be in the anticipated direction. In addition to the analysis prescribed above, other
statistical tests and procedures may be conducted as needed based on both the data
collected and the post hoc analysis conducted.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, data analysis procedures are explained and the results of the study are
presented. First, the response rate is discussed along with an assessment of non-response
bias. Then, the data screening process using a series of key informant checks which are
included within the survey is covered. Next, a discussion of how the data was prepared
prior to analysis is discussed followed by a description of the scale development process
adhered to in creating a measure to assess the customer‘s perceived salesperson control
over allowances. Then, measurement validation is explained followed by a discussion of
the procedures used for hypothesis testing. The chapter concludes with a consideration
of post hoc analysis and a summary of the overall results.

RESPONSE RATE
The context of this study is the U.S. soft drink industry with a specific focus on the
relationship between soft drink salespeople and retail store managers. A total of 180
convenience store managers were initially identified as participants in the survey mailing.
Convenience store chain ‗A‘ represented 112 potential respondents and chain ‗B‘
represented 68 respondents. All of the targeted store managers received the survey by
email.

Although some of the completed surveys were returned by fax, most were

returned to an email address created specifically for this study.
Of the 112 store managers from chain A 81 responded with completed surveys
representing a response rate of 72.3% for chain A. Of the 68 store managers from chain
B 61 responded with a completed survey representing a response rate of 89.7% for chain
B. In total, 142 of the original 180 store managers surveyed returned completed surveys
for an overall response rate of 78.9% for the study.

NON-RESPONSE BIAS
When conducting survey research it is important to assess differences between those who
respond to the survey versus those who do not respond. Armstrong and Overton (1977)
offer a method for comparing these two groups of participants, that is, respondents and
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non-respondents. The rational for this method is that late responders are similar to nonresponders. This presents the opportunity to use late responders as a proxy measure of
non-response bias. The technique put forth by Armstrong and Overton (1977) was used
for the current study. Specifically, mean differences for early responders (i.e., the first
25% of completed surveys returned) was compared to late responders (i.e., the last 25%
of completed surveys returned). There were no significant mean differences (p > .05)
found across the research variables of interest.

KEY INFORMANT CHECK
For the current study it was important that the survey respondents be screened based on
two criteria, familiarity and involvement, with both the salesperson and the allowances
paid by the selling firm. Three key informant checks were included in the survey to
ensure those customers providing completed surveys did in fact fit this profile. The first
key informant check assessed the extent to which the customer negotiated allowances
with his/her sales representative (i.e., ―I typically negotiate allowances from Pepsi with
my Pepsi salesperson‖).

This item was scored on a 7-point Likert scale with any

respondent scoring below 5 (n = 6) being deleted from the sample.
The second key informant check assessed the store manager‘s familiarity with
his/her salesperson (i.e., ―How familiar are you with your Pepsi sales representative?‖).
This item was scored on a 10-point scale from 1 being ―Not at all familiar‖ to 10 being
―Very familiar‖. Respondents scoring below 6 (n = 0) would have been deleted from the
final data set. However, there were no store managers reporting below the cut-off value
for this informant check.
As a final key informant check, store managers were assessed based on
familiarity with the allowances paid by the selling firm (i.e., ―How familiar are you with
the allowances you receive from Pepsi?‖). This item was scored on a 10-point scale from
1 being ―Not at all familiar‖ to 10 being ―Very familiar‖. Respondents scoring below 6
(n = 3) were deleted from the final data set. These three deleted responses were also
included and accounted for in a previously discussed key informant check. In sum,
screening respondents based on these key informant checks resulted in 6 participants
being deleted from the data set leading to a final sample size of 136 store managers.
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DATA PREPARATION
Completed surveys were returned by email and fax based on the participants ability to
reply.

The completed surveys were coded and entered into a Microsoft Excel

spreadsheet. Any missing data points were left blank. The spreadsheet was imported
into SPSS 15.0 for analysis. Missing data was assesses and replaced with the item mean.
Note that missing data was minimal across the sample and no single respondent
presented with excessive missing data.
As a preliminary measure, a principal components analysis was performed using
all items in the survey which related to a latent construct of interest. The PCA included
35 variables expected to represent a total of 5 constructs. Based on an eigenvalue cut-off
of 1.00, 6 components were identified accounting for 78.9% of variance. This was an
indication that an additional factor was present and may present challenges in the CFA
which was performed later. One possibility, which was included in the CFA, is that of a
method factor. Since the survey data comes from a single source, the customer, common
method bias may be an issue (Podsakoff et al 2003). The presence of a method factor to
significantly improve the model fit. Although some items exhibited clear indications of
cross loading on other latent constructs, all of the items were retained though the scale
development process for the perceived salesperson control of allowances scale and the
CFA of the remaining measures, each of which had been previously validated.

MEASUREMENT OF STUDY VARIABLES

PERCEIVED SALESPERSON CONTROL OF ALLOWANCES

This study involved several variables of interest for which validated measures have been
previously developed. However, it was necessary to develop a measure to assess the
customer‘s perceived salesperson control over the allowances in question. Note that for
the purposes of this research the actual control that a salesperson has over the allowances
paid by the selling firm is not important. But rather, this study is most interested in the
customer‘s perception of the salesperson‘s control over the allowances. For example,
when the customer asks the salesperson to increase the amount of an allowance does the
salesperson respond with ―I will have to check with my manager to see if we can do that‖
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(indicates lower control) or ―Let me make some calculations and I will let you know if I
can increase the allowance‖ (indicates higher control).

Thus, the actual control is not

considered in the current study.
The investigation into the impact allowances may have on the relationship
between a customer and salesperson requires a new measure to be developed.
Specifically, a measure, from the customer‘s perspective, of how much control the
salesperson has on the allowances the selling-firm pays. Thus, a measure was developed
and is referred to here as the Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances (PSCA). A
number of sources (e.g., - Churchill 1979, Gerbing and Anderson 1988) were sought to
provide guidance in the development of the PSCA scale. Based on recommendations
from such prior research, the scale development process included item generation based
on the conceptualization presented previously, followed by an assessment of content and
face validity, and concluding with reliability, dimensionality, and further validity testing.
The initial 16-items for the measure were developed by consulting the literature
on allowances (e.g., - Sudhir and Rao 2006) and perceived control (e.g., - O‘Driscoll and
Beehr 2000) in combination with one another. As a way to assess content and face
validity, these 16 items were subjected to expert judging. Experts contributing to this
step included a consumer goods salesperson familiar with allowances, a senior marketing
manager also employed in consumer goods and familiar with allowances, and a
university professor familiar with the literature on both perceived control and allowances.
Based on feedback from this panel of experts the scale was edited for clarity and reduced
to 10 items.
The 10-item measure was further assessed through a pretest of the survey. The
purpose of the pretest was to assess the PSCA scale for clarity, dimensionality, and
reliability. Since other measures included in the survey were previously validated scales,
the pretest also served to test the remainder of the survey for clarity and completion time.
Pretest subjects consisted of senior level marketing students at a major mid-western
university. Participants were provided with a scenario which indicated they were to
assume the role of a customer of a consumer goods company in the process of
negotiating over display space. The scenario indicated that when the customer (i.e., the
participant) asked a question regarding the allowances being offered, the salesperson
either responded in a way that indicated s/he was in control of the allowances or,
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conversely, s/he responded in a way that indicated a lack of control on the salesperson‘s
part. The participants then completed the survey with the scenario in mind. Although
based on a small sample size (n=20), the pretest indicated that further revisions were
necessary to improve clarity for future participants. Thus, the 10-item measure was
revised and included in the survey instrument developed for the current study.
As part of the main study, the 10-item PSCA scale was first assessed using
principal component analysis (PCA) in SPSS 15.0. The PSCA scale was subjected to
PCA using an eigenvalue of greater than 1.0 as a cut-off and employing varimax rotation.
This resulted in one factor being identified and explaining 70.1% of the variance.
However, due to a second component with an eigenvalue of .926 (close to 1.0) and a
single item with lower than desired loading (.425), the items were assessed a second time
using the same method but extracting a two-factor solution. The results indicated that
one item, item three, was clearly loading (.772) on a second factor and was subsequently
deleted from the PSCA scale.
Upon review, it was determined that the item removed, item 3, was important to
this research in that it assesses whether or not the customer negotiates allowances with
the salesperson. Therefore, data associated with the item was included in the dataset and
included as part of a three item key informant check. Also in relation to the results of the
two-factor solution, item 8 loaded on the second factor (.627) and item 9 indicated signs
of cross loading (.538) on the second factor. Thus, item 8 was deleted. However, item 9
indicated a loading of .616 on the primary factor and was retained for the following
confirmatory factor analysis.
The resulting 8-item PSCA scale was then subjected to confirmatory factor
analysis.

The goodness-of-fit and modification indices suggested further scale

purification was needed (χ2 (20) = 98.016, p<.01; RMSEA = .170; GFI = .852; AGFI =
.734; NFI = .929; CFI = .942). Items 2 and 6 were removed based in part on suggestions
in the modification indices. In addition, item 2 appears to be redundant with item 5 in
the measure.
The respecified model (see Figure 5.1) achieved acceptable fit (χ2 (8) = 9.995 p =
.265; RMSEA = .043; GFI = .977; AGFI = .940; NFI = .988; CFI = .998). Using the
average variance extracted as an indicator (AVE = .75), Fornell and Larcker‘s (1981)
minimum recommendation (>.50) was met thus providing evidence of convergent
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validity for the measure of Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances. Overall, this
measure demonstrated factor loadings which ranged from .71 to .93 with composite
reliability of .95, providing additional evidence of convergent validity.

FIGURE 5.1
CFA Measurement Model – Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances1,2
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Model fit: χ2 (2) = 4.131, p = .127; RMSEA = .089; GFI = .984; AGFI = .921; NFI =
.987; CFI = .993
2
Correlated error terms have been omitted for the sake of clarity.

CUSTOMER INVESTMENTS
The variable ‗customer investments‘ captures two key investments, time and money, that
the salesperson puts into the relationship with the customer.

In this case, ‗time‘

represents the number of sales calls made by a salesperson in relation to a particular
customer. Initially, an attempt was made to measure time based on sales call reports
provided by the selling firm. However, the record of sales calls across the customer
sample was incomplete and severely lacking. Therefore, the number of sales calls was
assessed at the customer level by including an item on the survey.
The secondary performance data spans a 16-week period so it was necessary to
assess the number of sales calls over the same time period. However, it is not realistic to

82

expect a customer to recall with any precision how often a salesperson called on him/her
in the ‗past 16-weeks‘. Based on this, the item included as part of the survey asks ―On
average, how often does your salesperson call on you‖ with responses coded by week.
The average number of calls per week as reported by the customer was them multiplied
by 16 to arrive at the number of sales calls over the 16-week period in question.
The ‗investment‘ element of ‗customer investments‘ was established based on the
allowances due to the customer over the same 16-week period in which secondary
performance data was provided.

Using the terminology of the selling firm, these

payments are part of a ‗customer development agreement‘ (CDA) and are referred to as
‗CDA payments‘. These payments are negotiated based on a per case basis and typically
require that certain performance criteria are met (e.g., minimum level of product
portfolio distribution) throughout the life of the agreement (usually one calendar year).
In addition to these allowances, salespeople can negotiate store level allowances to be
paid for such outcomes as new product distribution which may include permanent shelf
space or a temporary display to promote a certain product. The former is referred to in
the literature as a ‗slotting allowance‘ while the latter is referred to as a ‗display
allowance‘ (e.g., Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon 2000). Note that the selling firm in this
study refers to all in-store allowances related to products as ‗flex funding‘ indicating that
it is in addition to allowances paid as part of the CDA contract. Regardless of purpose,
these allowances are accounted for and combined as a single payment made to the
customer at a predetermined time, most often quarterly.
For the overall measure of ‗customer investments‘, the number of sales calls and
the dollar amount of allowances due on a per case basis were standardized and combined.
The variable ‗customer investments‘ was not included as part of the CFA presented later
in this chapter.

SALESPERSON-OWNED LOYALTY

The measure of Salesperson-Owned Loyalty (SOL) used for the current study was
adapted from a scale which was validated in prior research (Palmatier, Scheer, and
Steenkamp 2007). Thus, the six item measure was subjected to confirmatory factor
analysis. Based on the initial analysis, the goodness-of-fit and modification indices
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indicated the model exhibited poor fit (χ2 (9) = 229.361, p < .01; RMSEA = .426; GFI =
.656; AGFI = .197; NFI = .623; CFI = .628). Therefore, further scale purification was
necessary. Both item five (SOL5) and six (SOL6) were removed due to low factor
loadings, .54 and .55 respectively.
The respecified model (see Figure 5.2) achieved acceptable fit (χ2 (2) = 4.131, p =
.127; RMSEA = .089; GFI = .984; AGFI = .921; NFI = .987; CFI = .993). Using the
average variance extracted as an indicator (AVE = .67), Fornell and Larcker‘s (1981)
minimum recommendation (>.50) was met thus providing evidence of convergent
validity for the measure of salesperson-owned loyalty.

Overall, this measure

demonstrated factor loadings which ranged from .72 to .95 with composite reliability of
.89, providing additional evidence of convergent validity.
FIGURE 5.2
CFA Measurement Model – Salesperson-Owned Loyalty1
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Model fit: χ2 (2) = 4.131, p = .127; RMSEA = .089; GFI = .984; AGFI = .921; NFI =
.987; CFI = .993

FIRM-OWNED LOYALTY
The measure of Firm-Owned Loyalty (FOL) used for the current study was adapted from
a scale which was validated in prior research (Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp 2007).
Thus, the six item measure was subjected to confirmatory factor analysis. Based on the
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initial analysis, the goodness-of-fit and modification indices indicated the model
exhibited poor fit (χ2 (9) = 191.186, p<.01; RMSEA = .387; GFI = .332; AGFI = .662;
NFI = .662; CFI = .670). Therefore, further scale purification was necessary. Both items
four (FOL4) and six (FOL6) were removed due to low factor loadings, .52 and .43
respectively.
The respecified model (see Figure 5.3) achieved acceptable fit (χ2 (1) = .416, p =
.519; RMSEA = .000; GFI = .998; AGFI = .985; NFI = .999; CFI = 1.000). Using the
average variance extracted as an indicator (AVE = .64), Fornell and Larcker‘s (1981)
minimum recommendation (>.50) was met thus providing evidence of convergent
validity for the measure of firm-owned loyalty. Overall, this measure demonstrated
factor loadings which ranged from .60 to .93 with composite reliability of .88, providing
additional evidence of convergent validity.

FIGURE 5.3
CFA Measurement Model – Firm-Owned Loyalty1,2
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Model fit: χ2 (1) = .416, p = .519; RMSEA = .000; GFI = .998; AGFI = .985; NFI =
.999; CFI = 1.000
2

Correlated error terms have been omitted for the sake of clarity.
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SALESPERSON INFLUENCE

The measure of Salesperson Influence used for the current study was adapted from a
scale which was validated as a measure of salesperson manifest influence in prior
research (McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani 2006). Thus, the seven item measure
was subjected to confirmatory factor analysis.

Based on the initial analysis, the

goodness-of-fit and modification indices indicated the model exhibited less than
acceptable fit (χ2 (14) = 84.8677, p<.01; RMSEA = .194; GFI = .847; AGFI = .693; NFI
= .928; CFI = .938). Therefore, further scale purification was necessary. Based on
recommendations provided in the modification indices, select error terms were correlated
and the model was reassessed.
The respecified model (see Figure 5.4) achieved acceptable fit (χ2 (9) = 15.267, p
= .084; RMSEA = .072; GFI = .972; AGFI = .912; NFI = .987; CFI = .995). Using the
average variance extracted as an indicator (AVE = .79), Fornell and Larcker‘s (1981)
minimum recommendation (>.50) was met thus providing evidence of convergent
validity for the measure of firm-owned loyalty. Overall, this measure demonstrated
factor loadings which ranged from .82 to .96 with composite reliability of .96, providing
additional evidence of convergent validity.
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FIGURE 5.4
CFA Measurement Model – Salesperson Influence1,2
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Model fit: χ2 (9) = 15.267, p = .084; RMSEA = .072; GFI = .972; AGFI = .912; NFI =
.987; CFI = .995
2
Correlated error terms have been omitted for the sake of clarity.
SALESPERSON PERFORMANCE WITH THE CUSTOMER

The measure of Salesperson Performance with the Customer used for the current study
was adapted from a scale which was validated in prior research (Sujan, Weitz, & Kumar
1994). Thus, the six item measure was subjected to confirmatory factor analysis. Based
on the initial analysis, the goodness-of-fit and modification indices indicated the model
exhibited poor fit (χ2 (9) = 54.887, p<.01; RMSEA = .194; GFI = .874; AGFI = .707;
NFI = .936; CFI = .946). Therefore, further scale purification was necessary. Based on
recommendations provided in the modification indices, select error terms were correlated
and the model was reassessed.
The respecified model (see Figure 5.5) achieved acceptable fit (χ2 (8) = 12.722, p
= .122; RMSEA = .066; GFI = .969; AGFI = .919; NFI = .985; CFI = .994). Using the
average variance extracted as an indicator (AVE = .75), Fornell and Larcker‘s (1981)
minimum recommendation (>.50) was met thus providing evidence of convergent
validity for the measure of firm-owned loyalty. Overall, this measure demonstrated
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factor loadings which ranged from .74 to .96 with composite reliability of .95, providing
additional evidence of convergent validity.

FIGURE 5.5
CFA Measurement Model – Salesperson Performance with Customer1,2
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Model fit: χ2 (8) = 12.722, p = .122; RMSEA = .066; GFI = .969; AGFI = .919; NFI =
.985; CFI = .994
2

Correlated error terms have been omitted for the sake of clarity.

CONTROL VARIABLES

Customer Familiarity with Allowances

Although it is very important to ensure that customers participating in the survey have
dealings with the allowances paid by the selling firm, it is desirable to control for the
effects of ‗just being familiar‘ with this activity. The study aims to understand the
impact that these allowances have on the relationship of interest beyond simple
familiarity with the practice. Therefore, a single item (i.e., How familiar are you with the
allowances you receive from Pepsi?) was used to assess this area of familiarity. As with
the previous familiarity measure, this item was also used as an informant check to screen
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those customers who indicate a lack of familiarity with the salesperson (i.e., scoring < 6
on a 1 to 10 scale). This measure consists of a single-item reflective indicator and was
not included in the CFA used to assess overall fit of the measurement model.

Customer Familiarity with Salesperson
Just as familiarity of the allowances is a necessary, although not sufficient, characteristic
of survey respondents; the customer‘s familiarity with the salesperson is just as
important.

This is due to the fact that this study is assessing the impact that a

salesperson‘s control over allowances may have on his/her relationship with the
customer. Therefore, a single item (i.e., How familiar are you with your Pepsi sales
representative?) was used to assess familiarity. This item was also used as an informant
check to screen those customers who indicate a lack of familiarity with the practice (i.e.,
scoring < 6 on a 1 to 10 scale). This measure consists of a single-item reflective
indicator and was not included in the CFA used to assess overall fit of the measurement
model.

MEASUREMENT MODEL

Convergent validity of the individual constructs was supported and the next step was to
test the overall measurement model (see Figure 5.6) which included all 5 constructs (i.e.,
latent variables) and 25 indicators (i.e., observed variables).

The model was assessed

and based on the initial analysis, the goodness-of-fit and modification indices indicated
the model exhibited poor fit (χ2 (9) = 54.887, p<.01; RMSEA = .194; GFI = .874; AGFI
= .707; NFI = .936; CFI = .946). The initial model was respecified and tested but fit
improved only marginally. From this point, multiple models were specified and assessed
without any individual model nearing an acceptable fit.
Based on the analysis of competing models it appeared that the customer loyalty
variables, salesperson- and firm-owned loyalty, were in conflict with the salesperson
influence and performance constructs. One explanation is that the observed variables for
loyalty were cross loading onto the influence and performance constructs. In fact, one
observed loyalty variable, SOL4, appeared to be the most highly offending indicator.
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FIGURE 5.6
Full Measurement Model1,2
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Model fit: χ2 (9) = 54.887, p<.01; RMSEA = .194; GFI = .874; AGFI = .707; NFI = .936; CFI = .946
2
Correlated error terms have been omitted for the sake of clarity.

E20

Although deleting this indicator did substantially improve the overall model fit, a
decision was made to retain the item based on theoretical grounds. Specifically, this item
is more clearly indicative of the salesperson-owned loyalty construct than any other item
as it states ―I feel greater loyalty toward this salesperson than to Pepsi as a company‖.
The aim of this measure is to assess the degree of customer loyalty directed toward the
salesperson versus the selling-firm. This particular item is at the core of this construct
and was retained. The next step was to assess two separate partial models in an attempt
to identify acceptable fit.

PARTIAL MEASUREMENT MODEL

The poor fit of the overall measurement model appeared to be due to the loyalty variables
being in the same model with the influence and performance constructs. The solution
was to test one partial measurement model with both loyalty variables and perceived
salesperson control of allowances and a second partial measurement model replacing the
loyalty variables with the influence and performance constructs.
The first partial measurement model tested included the constructs and indicators
for perceived salesperson control of allowances, salesperson- , and firm-owned loyalty.
Based on the initial analysis, the goodness-of-fit and modification indices indicated the
model exhibited marginal fit (χ2 (71) = 108.480, p = .003; RMSEA = .063; GFI = .905;
AGFI = .859; NFI = .934; CFI = .976). Although the model failed the chi-square test,
when all fit indicators are considered the model fit is marginal. As in the previous CFA,
deleting item 4 from the salesperson-owned loyalty measure would have resulted in an
acceptable fit. However, as stated before, this item is central to the construct and was
thus retained.

Based on this decision, further scale purification was not necessary.

Across the measurement model factor loadings ranged from .60 to .96. Composite
reliability ranged from .88 to .95 while AVE ranged from .64 to .75. The AVE for each
construct exceeded its squared covariance with each of the other constructs providing
evidence of discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981).
The second partial measurement model tested included the constructs and
indicators for perceived salesperson control of allowances, salesperson-owned influence,
and salesperson performance with the customer.
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Based on the initial analysis, the

goodness-of-fit and modification indices indicated the model had a poor fit (χ2 (116) =
252.241, p < .01; RMSEA = .093; GFI = .821; AGFI = .763; NFI = .905; CFI = .946).
Therefore, further scale purification was necessary.

First, item 5 and 6 from the

performance measure were deleted as both demonstrated cross loading with the influence
construct. Second, items 3, 4, and 5 form the influence measure were removed due to
cross loading with the other constructs in the model. The respecified model achieved
acceptable fit (χ2 (48) = 57.437, p = .165; RMSEA = .038; GFI = .938; AGFI = .899; NFI
= .966; CFI = .994). Across the measurement model factor loadings ranged from .71 to
.95. Composite reliability ranged from .92 to .95 while AVE ranged from .75 to .86.
The AVE for each construct exceeded its squared covariance with each of the other
constructs providing evidence of discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981).

HYPOTHESIS TESTING

STRUCTURAL MODEL FITTING
The hypotheses for this study were tested using structural equation modeling in AMOS
7, the process and results are presented here. The hypothesized structural model (see
Figure 5.7) was assessed and indicated poor fit (χ2 (8) = 133.447, p = .000; RMSEA =
.341; GFI = .812; AGFI = .507; NFI = .325; CFI = .313). The modification indices
suggested the addition of direct relationships from salesperson influence to salespersonand firm-owned loyalty and from firm-owned loyalty to salesperson performance with
the customer. Although these relationships were not hypothesized, each one was found
to be theoretically justified and added to the model. Note that the modification indices
suggested an additional direct relationship however it was not added to the model as it
did not align with theory.
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FIGURE 5.7
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Model fit: χ2 (8) = 133.447, p = .000; RMSEA = .341; GFI = .812; AGFI = .507; NFI = .325; CFI = .313

The respecified model (see Figure 5.8) indicated good fit (χ2 (4) = 4.359, p =
.360; RMSEA = .026; GFI = .989; AGFI = .945; NFI = .978; CFI = .998). However, not
all paths in the model were found to significant. In particular, two paths, firm-owned
loyalty and salesperson performance with the customer both leading to selling firm
performance, were found to be not significant. This may be due to the fact that selling
firm performance is measured at the firm-level with the secondary data of sales volume
while firm-owned loyalty and salesperson performance consists of primary data assessed
at the customer-level. There are many factors which contribute to the actual sales
volume at a given retail location beyond the variables in this study. In particular,
competitive activity in the store, the local economy, and the local weather all are thought
to have a significant impact on overall sales volume of carbonated soft drinks. This
realization became apparent at a point in the current study beyond which these variables
could accurately be controlled. The next step was to test for the hypothesized main
effects in the structural model.
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FIGURE 5.8
Respecified Structural Model1
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Note: Moderation hypotheses are depicted by dashed lines. Main effect hypotheses are represented by bold lines. Additional lines
were added based on modification indices as described previously.
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Model fit: χ2 (4) = 4.359, p = .360; RMSEA = .026; GFI = .989; AGFI = .945; NFI = .978; CFI = .998

*Supported and significant at the p < .01 level (H1b, H2c, H2d, and H3b were not supported).
**Supported and significant at the p < .05 level

MAIN EFFECT HYPOTHESES

For a summary of hypotheses and support found, see table 5.2 at the conclusion of this
chapter. The main effect hypotheses presented in chapter three were tested next using
the respecified structural model (see Figure 5.8 above). First, the relationship between
salesperson influence and salesperson performance with the customer was both positive
and significant (β = .223, p < .01) and in the hypothesized direction. Thus, H1a was
supported.
Second, the direct relationship between customer investments and salespersonowned loyalty was both positive and significant (β = .030, p < .01) and in the effect was
observed in the hypothesized direction. Thus, H2a was supported. Third, the main effect
from salesperson- to firm-owned loyalty was negative and significant (β = -.230, p <
.01), however, this effect was not in the hypothesized direction and was found to be
counter to prior research. Thus, H2c was not supported.
Next, the effect of salesperson-owned loyalty on salesperson performance with
the customer was both positive and significant (β = .170, p < .01) and in found to be in
the hypothesized direction. Thus, H2b was supported. Additionally, the main effect
from firm-owned loyalty leading to selling firm performance was negligible and not
significant (β = -.002, p = .811). Therefore, H2d was not supported. Finally, the main
effect between salesperson performance with the customer and selling firm performance
was not significant (β = .010, p = .304). Thus, H1b was not supported. The next step
was to test the moderation hypotheses. The moderator testing procedure and results are
presented next.

MODERATION HYPOTHESIS TESTING

A multigroup analysis approach was used to assess the moderation hypothesis. The
multigroup method prescribes that two groups should be established based a median split
thereby creating a high and low group based on the moderating variable. Then two
models are to be specified and assessed via a chi-square difference test. One model is
tested with all hypothesized paths constrained which does not allow the model to vary
across the high and low groups. The second model is tested with all hypothesized paths
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constrained with the exception of the path which is expected to be moderated. This
allows the hypothesized path to vary across the high and low groups of the moderating
variable. If the chi-square difference is significant, and the effect is in the hypothesized
direction, then moderation is indicated.
First, the moderation effect was assessed for the impact of the perceived
salesperson control of allowances on the direct relationship between customer
investments and salesperson-owned loyalty. The multigroup analysis indicated mixed
results. The chi-square difference test was completed first. The constrained model
indicated χ2 (26) = 182.563, p = .000 and the second model with the hypothesized
moderated relationship free to vary across the two groups indicated χ2 (24) = 176.009, p
= .000. This result suggested moderation due to a significant chi-square difference at the
p < .05 level (χ2 (2) = 6.554, p = .0377). Although the effect was observed to be in the
hypothesized direction, that is high control has a more positive effect than low control,
only in the high control group was the relationship between customer investments and
salesperson-owned loyalty significant (p < .01). Therefore, the multigroup analysis
indicated partial support for the moderation effect hypothesized in H3a.
Next, the moderation effect was assessed for the impact of the perceived
salesperson control of allowances on the direct relationship between salesperson
influence and salesperson performance with the customer. The multigroup analysis
indicated mixed results.

The chi-square difference test was completed first.

The

constrained model indicated χ2 (26) = 182.563, p = .000 and the second model with the
hypothesized moderated relationship free to vary across the two groups indicated χ2 (24)
= 149.024, p = .000. This result suggested moderation due to a significant chi-square
difference (χ2 (2) = 33.539, p = .000). Although the chi-sqaure difference test was
significant, the effect was not found to be in the anticipated direction. That is, low
control has a more positive effect than high control on the relationship between
salesperson influence and salesperson performance with the customer. Therefore, the
multigroup analysis lead to mixed results in regard to H3b.
Based on indications from prior model testing and the subsequent mixed results
from the multigroup analysis, a series of post hoc models were specified and assessed for
additional effects of moderation. This process resulted in one additional relationship
exhibiting characteristics of moderation, that is, the direct effect from salesperson-owned
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loyalty leading to salesperson performance with the customer. The procedure and results
are presented next.

POST HOC ANALYSIS

STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING

A second structural model was tested using the same procedure as described previously.
The alteration in the post hoc model was that the focal relationship for moderation was
now between salesperson-owned loyalty and the salesperson‘s performance with
customer. The question is what impact the customer‘s perception of the salesperson‘s
control over allowances may have on the ability of the salesperson to leverage loyalty to
drive individual performance. The previous model with established fit was used to
perform a multigroup analysis. All paths were constrained and as expected the fixed
model chi-square was the same as before (χ2 (26) = 182.563, p = .000).
The second model differed in that the free parameter was now the path from
salesperson-owned loyalty leading to the salesperson‘s performance with the customer.
The chi-square for this model (χ2 (25) = 164.355, p = .000) was found to be significantly
different from the fixed path model (χ2 (1) = 18.208, p = .000. In addition, the effect
was found to be in the expected direction, that is, high control lead to a stronger positive
relationship between salesperson-owned loyalty and salesperson performance with the
customer. When combined, these results provide strong evidence of a moderation effect.
In sum, mixed results and partial support for moderation was found across the
initial structural model. More definite results were found for moderation in the post hoc
model. This leads to a more defined, although not entirely clear, series of relationships
among the variables. In an attempt to more fully understand how these variables are
interacting with one another the decision was made to isolate each relationship along
with the moderator variable in separate regression models. The models were tested using
multiple regression. The procedure and results are presented next.
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MULTIPLE REGRESSION

Hypothesized Moderation

Following the temporal order of model testing in the previous discussion of the structural
model, the relationship between customer investments and salesperson-owned loyalty
was tested first for the possible effects of the moderating variable, perceived salesperson
control of allowances. The model is represented as:
SOL = α0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X1X2 + β4X3 + β5X4 + ε1

Where:

SOL = Salesperson-Owned Loyalty
X1 = Customer Investments
X2 = Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances
Control variables:

X3 = Customer Familiarity with Allowances
X4 = Customer Familiarity with Salesperson

Guidelines provided by Hair et al (1998) were adopted to address the possibility of
multicollinearity. First, each of the independent variables was mean centered in an
attempt to mitigate the potential for multicollinearity. The correlation matrix for all of
the independent variables indicated that none exhibited correlations above .90 (see Table
5.1 below). In addition, the model resulted in variance inflation factors ranging from
1.018 to 1.203, (all well below the recommended cut-off value of < 10) and tolerance
ranging from .831 to .982 well above the recommended cut-off of > .10 (Hair et al 1998).
Taken together, these indicators suggest that multicollinearity was not present in this
model.
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TABLE 5.1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations

100

PSCA
SOL
FOL
SIC
SPC
SFP
TIME
REPFAM
DCAFAM

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Perceived
Salesperson
Control of
Allowances
(PSCA)

4.75
3.95
6.15
5.14
5.76
0.01
37.65
8.29
7.56

1.53
1.68
1.00
1.41
1.27
0.06
12.24
0.97
1.11

1.00
.340**
0.02
.286**
.246**
.177*
.260**
.210*
0.05

SalespersonOwned
Loyalty
(SOL)

FirmOwned
Loyalty
(FOL)

Salesperson
Influence on
Customer
(SIC)

Salesperson
Performance
w/ Customer
(SPC)

Selling
Firm
Performance
(SFP)

Salesperson
Sales Calls
w/Customer
(TIME)

Customer
Familiarity w/
Salesperson
(REPFAM)

Customer
Familiarity w/
Allowances
(DCAFAM)

1.00
-0.02
.599**
.371**
.282**
.268**
.190*
-0.10

1.00
.387**
.486**
0.02
-0.04
.238**
0.06

1.00
.541**
0.09
0.09
.300**
-0.10

1.00
.186*
0.14
0.15
0.07

1.00
0.08
0.09
-0.03

1.00
.231**
.245**

1.00
.336**

1.00

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Note: ‘TIME’ consists of the number of sales calls made over timeframe of the study which explains a mean and standard deviation higher than other variables.
This measure was standardized prior to hypothesis testing. Standardization of the variable involved subtracting the mean from the original score and dividing by
the standard deviation.

The results of the analysis show a positive and significant main effect between customer
investments and salesperson-owned loyalty (β1 = .038, p < .01) providing additional
support to the structural model for H2a. The results of the analysis also show a positive
and significant interaction effect for perceived salesperson control of allowances on the
relationship between customer investments and salesperson-owned loyalty (β3 = .015, p <
.05). This finding indicates that the perception on the part of the customer that the
salesperson has a level of control over the allowances has a positive impact on
salesperson-owned loyalty. This result provides evidence in support of H3a.
The interaction was graphed to provide a visual representation of the effects
taking place among the variables (see Figure 5.9). However, recall from the multigroup
analysis of the structural model that in the low control group the relationship between
customer investments and salesperson-owned loyalty was not significant. That finding
taken in combination with the regression analysis may indicate that high perceived
control is a benefit in terms of loyalty however low perceived control is not as
detrimental as one may expect.
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High

Low Control
High Control

Low

Salesperson-Owned Loyalty

FIGURE 5.9
Moderating Effect of Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances on
Customer Investments and Salesperson-Owned Loyalty

Low Investments

High Investments

Next, the relationship between salesperson influence and salesperson performance with
the customer was tested first for the possible effects of the moderating variable,
perceived salesperson control of allowances. The model is represented as:
SPC = α0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X1X2 + β4X3 + β5X4 + ε1
Where:
SPC = Salesperson Performance with the Customer
X1 = Salesperson Influence on the Customer
X2 = Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances
Control variables:
X3 = Customer Familiarity with Allowances
X4 = Customer Familiarity with Salesperson
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Once again, following the guidelines provided by Hair et al (1998), multicollinearity was
assessed. The independent variables was mean centered and the correlation matrix for all
of the independent variables indicated that none exhibited correlations above .90 (see
Table 5.1 above). In addition, the variance inflation factors were present ranging from
1.069 to 1.309, (all well below the recommended cut-off value of < 10) and tolerance
ranging from .764 to .936 well above the recommended cut-off of > .10 (Hair et al 1998).
Taken together, these indicators suggest that multicollinearity was not an issue among
the predictor variables in the model.
The results of the analysis demonstrate a positive and significant main effect (β1 =
.519, p = .000) between salesperson influence and salesperson performance with the
customer offering additional support for H1a. The results of the analysis also show a
non-significant negative interaction effect (β3 = -.126, p = .152) for perceived salesperson
control of allowances on this relationship. Thus the moderation hypothesis, H3b, is not
supported. Recall that this moderation effect was not supported previously either based
on the multigroup analysis procedure conducted in AMOS 7.0 which bolsters confidence
in the overall finding.

POST HOC MODEL

Next, the relationship between salesperson-owned loyalty and salesperson performance
with the customer was tested for the possible effects of the moderating variable,
perceived salesperson control of allowances. The model is represented as:
SPC = α0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X1X2 + β4X3 + β5X4 + β6X5 + ε1

Where:
SPC = Salesperson Performance with Customer
X1 = Salesperson-Owned Loyalty
X2 = Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances
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Control variables:
X3 = Customer Familiarity with Allowances
X4 = Customer Familiarity with Salesperson
X5 = Firm-Owned Loyalty
As with the previous regression model, guidelines provided by Hair et al (1998) were
used to address the potential for multicollinearity. Each one of the independent variables
was mean centered in an attempt to lessen the possibility of multicollinearity. The
correlation matrix for all of the independent variables indicated that none of the variables
exhibited correlations above .90 (see Table 5.1 above). In addition, the resulting model
resulted in variance inflation factors ranging from 1.137 to 1.294, (all well below the
recommended cut-off value of < 10) and tolerance ranging from .773 to .880 well above
the recommended cut-off of > .10 (Hair et al 1998).

Taken together, these indicators

suggest that multicollinearity was not an issue among the independent variables in the
model.
The results of the analysis show a positive and significant main effect (β1 = .307,
p = .000) between salesperson-owned loyalty and the salesperson‘s performance with the
customer which coincides with the finding based on the multigroup analysis conducted
previously. The results of the analysis also demonstrate a significant negative interaction
effect (β2 = -.087, p < .01) for perceived salesperson control of allowances on the
relationship between salesperson-owned loyalty and the salesperson‘s performance with
the customer. This finding indicates that the perception on the part of the customer that
the salesperson has a high level of control over the allowances actually has a negative
impact on the salesperson‘s ability to leverage customer loyalty to drive performance.
This finding is counterintuitive and runs contrary to the overall assumption in this study
that high perceived salesperson control of allowances is a benefit to the salesperson and
the selling firm. The interaction was graphed to provide a visual representation of the
effects taking place among the variables (see Figure 5.10). Although this effect flows
from post hoc analysis and was not set-forth a priori, it provides the other side of the
control variable coin, that is, the downside of salesperson control.
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High

Low Control
High Control

Low

Salesperson Performance w/ Customer

FIGURE 5.10
Moderating Effect of Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances on
Salesperson-Owned Loyalty and Salesperson Performance with Customer

Low Loyalty

High Loyalty

SUMMARY
The overall results demonstrated a positive and significant main effect between then
predictor variables customer investments and salesperson influence with salespersonowned loyalty.

A positive and significant main effect was also observed between

salesperson-owned loyalty and salesperson performance. The data analysis failed to
show support for the hypothesized main effect between salesperson- and firm-owned
loyalty, firm-owned loyalty and selling firm performance, or salesperson performance
and selling firm performance. Moderation analysis using multiple methods suggested
when the customer perceives that the salesperson has a high level of control over the
allowances; the customer‘s loyalty toward the salesperson is enhanced while
performance is dampened. This unexpected finding is explored further in the discussion
presented in the following chapter.
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TABLE 5.2
Summary of Hypotheses and Support Found
Hypothesis

Supported

Main Effects
H1a: Salesperson influence positively affects salesperson performance with

Yes**

the customer.
H1b: Salesperson performance positively affects selling firm performance.

No

H2a: Customer Investments positively affect salesperson-owned loyalty.

Yes**

H2b: Salesperson-owned loyalty positively affects salesperson performance

Yes**

with the customer.
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H2c: Salesperson-owned loyalty positively affects firm-owned loyalty.

No

H2d: Firm-owned loyalty positively affects selling firm performance.

No

Moderation Effects
H3a: High (Low) perceived salesperson control of channel allowances
enhances (diminishes) the positive effect of customer investments
on salesperson-owned loyalty.

Yes (High)*
No (Low)

H3b: High (Low) perceived salesperson control of channel allowances
enhances (diminishes) the positive effect of salesperson influence
on salesperson performance with the customer.

No (High)
No (Low)

**Significant at the p < .01 level (two-tailed)
*Significant at the p < .05 level (two-tailed)

CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the research implications are discussed. First, theoretical implications are
presented with a focus on channel allowances literature as well as salesperson control
and cognitive evaluation theory. Next, managerial implications are explored based on
the research findings with guidance for sales managers. Then, a set of limitations in
relation to the research context and data sources for the current study are put forth. The
chapter concludes with consideration given to potential directions for future research in
the area of downstream channel allowances.

CONCLUSIONS
This study investigated the effects, both positive and negative, which may be present due
to the customer‘s perception of salesperson control over channel allowances.

Key

variables of the study relating to the customer-salesperson relationship included
investments of time made by the salesperson in the form of sales calls, the financial
investment made by the selling firm in the form of channel allowances, customer loyalty
directed toward the salesperson and the selling firm, the salesperson‘s influence on the
customer‘s decision making, and the salesperson‘s performance with the customer.
The findings supported the idea that customer investments have a positive impact
on achieving salesperson-owned loyalty. Further, this relationship is enhanced when the
customer perceives that the salesperson holds a high level of control over channel
allowances. Also, support was found for the positive impact of salesperson influence on
salesperson performance with the customer. However, contrary to expectations, this
relationship was not moderated by the perception of salesperson control over allowances.
In regard to additional main effects, the results suggest that, in addition to salesperson
influence, salesperson-owned loyalty also has a positive impact on the salesperson‘s
performance with the customer. However, post hoc analysis demonstrated that high
perceived salesperson control over allowances decreases this positive relationship. This
effect was not hypothesized and occurred in opposite direction of what would have been
expected which begs for explanation while leading to further questions.
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What is to be made of the finding that high salesperson control is a benefit to
engendering customer loyalty toward the salesperson but a hindrance to actual
salesperson performance with the customer? Recall that data for both salesperson-owned
loyalty and salesperson performance with the firm was provided by the customer.
Therefore, regardless of the potential for common method bias, at least in this instance
the same source is indicating different moderation effects for the same variable across
two important relationships.
At first inspection, it would seem at odds that high control is beneficial to loyalty
while detrimental to performance. However, there may be a very good theoretically
grounded explanation for this finding. In the first instance, salesperson owned loyalty
benefits from high control just as cognitive evaluation theory would predict. In the
presence of high perceived salesperson control the payments are intrinsic to the
customer-salesperson relationship.

That is, the motivation results from channel

allowance payments which are perceived to be internal to the relationship as opposed to
being controlled by some outside force such as a sales manager. Cognitive evaluation
theory, as applied to the customer-salesperson relationship in this research, indicates that
this level of perceived control would increase the customer‘s intrinsic motivation toward
the relationship with the salesperson.

This would be in line with the theoretical

framework of set forth in this dissertation.
The next logical question is why then does the same reasoning not hold true in
relation to salesperson performance to the customer? First, it is necessary to why this
effect may be present before considering it in combination with the prior effect. An
explanation as to why high perceived control would be detrimental to salesperson
performance can be found in the literature on power-dependence theory (Emerson 1962)
and the possible effects of power within a distribution channel (Gaski 1984). Powerdependence theory and related literature would suggest that, in the context of a sales
exchange, when one partner is more powerful the other partner is more dependent.
Going further, the dependent exchange partner would likely not appreciate being placed
in a position dependency on another. This negative effect would be more pronounced in
the context of the current study because the customer in a position of dependency for
money.
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It is reasonable to expect that the customer would not feel positive about being
dependent on a salesperson for channel allowances and may respond negatively toward
that salesperson. So, if this is the case, why then does the data show that the customer
responded positively toward the salesperson in terms of loyalty? It may be that the
customer loyalty credited to the salesperson is not voluntary but rather coerced. The
customer may feel compelled to demonstrate a certain degree of loyalty toward the
salesperson due to the perception that the salesperson controls the purse strings to the
channel allowances. However, when it comes to performance, the customer is less
inclined to demonstrate a positive opinion.
The results of the data analysis failed to support any additional hypothesized
relationships. Specifically, the results indicated a significantly negative relationship
between salesperson- and firm-owned loyalty. This finding is in contradiction with prior
research in that the expected ―spill-over‖ effect was not present indicating this finding
may be spurious and caused by the specific to research context or the adapted measure of
firm-owned loyalty. In addition, there was no significant relationship emanating from
neither firm-owned loyalty nor salesperson performance leading to selling firm
performance. This lack of effect is most likely due to the fact that many different factors
contribute to the selling firm‘s performance with firm-owned and loyalty and the
salesperson‘s performance being only a small contributing factor.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
The salesperson‘s role is to bridge the gap between the customer and the selling
firm. This is not always an enjoyable position to hold, however, it can be very influential
on both sides of the exchange.

The current study inquired as to whether or not

salespeople should convey to customer‘s a high or low level of control over channel
allowances. The actual level of control the salesperson had allowances was not germane
to this study. After all, if the customer believes the salesperson has no control over the
allowances paid by the selling firm, it matters very little how much control the
salesperson actually has in the situation.
In regard to channel allowances, there has been a long and ongoing debate as to
the advantages and disadvantages associated with this practice. This debate typically
109

centers around whether powerful retailers force manufacturers to pay excessive
allowances or powerful manufacturers squeeze out competition by offering to pay higher
allowances than smaller manufacturers are able to afford. Lost in the determination to
seek a resolution to this debate has been the impact that channel allowances have on the
relationship between the customer and the salesperson. The current investigation did not
set-out to contribute to the debate or attempt resolution. Rather, the aim of this study was
to shed some light upon the effect, good or bad, that these allowances have on the
relationship between a customer and a salesperson.
Another contribution of this research relates to cognitive evaluation theory. This
theory has been used almost exclusively in studies where an individual engaged in a task
is offered and incentive to perform the given task.

Although scholars sometimes

disagree, multiple studies have shown that a person‘s level of intrinsic motivation is
decreased in the presence of an extrinsic motivator, most often money.
The current research adds an element of nuance to the prior applications of
cognitive evaluation theory. That is, the focal activity is not an individual engaging in a
task but rather two people engaging in a relationship. More specifically, a customer and
a salesperson engaged in a business relationship in which money is involved and may or
may not serve as a source of motivation.

Based on this application of cognitive

evaluation theory, if the channel allowance is controlled by the salesperson then it is
internal to the relationship and would not decrease intrinsic motivation. Since intrinsic
motivation is not decreased there is no subsequent negative impact to interpersonal
relationship elements such as loyalty. However, if the channel allowances are controlled
by a force external to the relationship (e.g., a sales manager), the customer‘s intrinsic
motivation may decrease leading to a dampening effect of the feelings of loyalty toward
the salesperson.

MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
Discontinuing the use of allowances does not appear to be a viable option in today‘s
marketplace. Therefore, it is beneficial to understand the effects of these allowances and
how managers may better deal with discussing allowances with customers and to what
extent salespeople should be involved. A check of the literature for guidance as to the
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level of control a salesperson should have over channel allowances proved unhelpful.
Prior research (e.g., Hersey and Blanchard 1982) suggest that more experienced
salespeople would benefit from a high level of control. However, more recent research
(e.g., Ahearne, Mathieu, and Rapp 2005) would suggest that less experienced salespeople
would be most likely to benefit from empowerment. Of course none of the literature
provided guidance precisely to the question of salesperson control over channel
allowances thus highlighting the research gap filled by the current study.
Based on findings from the present research, it would appear that the saleperson‘s
perceived control over channel allowances act as a double-edged sword. On the one
hand, when a salesperson is perceived to have a high level of control over the allowances
there is a clear benefit to engendering salesperson-owned loyalty. On the other hand,
high perceived control has a deleterious effect on the salesperson‘s ability to the leverage
that loyalty to increase performance. The findings suggest that high salesperson control
benefits loyalty while decreasing performance.
This leaves managers in the position of either encouraging salespeople to convey
accountability to customers regarding the allowances or for the salesperson to defer
accountability to the sales manager. It is important to note that the findings did not
suggest low perceived control significantly hindered the salesperson‘s ability to engender
loyalty, only that high control was beneficial. One of the focal variables in this study
was salesperson-owned loyalty (i.e.,customer loyalty directed toward the salesperson as
opposed to the selling firm). Prior research suggest that maximizing salesperson-owned
loyalty may not be desirable for the selling (Palmatier et al 2007). High customer loyalty
toward a salesperson would be a potential detriment to the selling firm if the salesperson
were to leave and join a competitor. One of the key findings of this research is that
selling firm‘s can avoid high salesperson-owned loyalty while enhancing the
salesperson‘s performance simultaneously. That is, low control decreases salespersonowned loyalty while at the same time increasing the salesperson‘s performance. Thus,
managers will be best served by training salespeople to deflect decision making authority
away from him/herself and toward the sales manager. It is worth noting that this is in
contradiction with the expected outcome of this study.
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Therefore, managers may be best served by salespeople with low perceived
control, which is opposite to the fundamental hypothesis in this research. With low
perceived control the manager forgoes maximizing salesperson-owned loyalty while
minimizing the threat of high perceived control to salesperson performance. This would
allow the salesperson to deflect decision making regarding allowances onto others within
the selling firm (e.g., a sales manager).

LIMITATIONS
The current research suffers from the following limitations. First, the intentions of the
channel allowances in regard to this research are unknown. The payments made by the
selling firm combine slotting allowances, display allowances, and promotional
allowances into a single quarterly payment. It is unknown if, or to what degree, the
purpose of the channel allowances would have on the relationships examined in this
research. It would be valuable from the sales manager‘s perspective to know whether or
not this element makes a difference in the way channel allowances are perceived by
customers. Existing literature tends ot focus on either slotting allowances or promotional
allowances exclusively. When different types of allowances are included in a single
study, there is no distinction made as to the intentions of the allowance being paid. That
limitation is shared in the current research as well.
Second, only a single retail channel (i.e, convenience stores) was represented in
the study.

Based on access to customers and secondary data, this limitation was

unavoidable. However, there are benefits related to control based on this limitation. For
example, due to the consistency of channel partners participating in the survey research
there is no need to sacrifice sample size in order to control for various channels of
distribution. However, the downside is that it remains unresolved as to whether large
grocery store chains, drug store chains, department stores, etc. would all demonstrate
comparable results with this study.
Third, only a single product category (i.e., carbonated soft drinks) was included
in this study. As with the different retail stores mentioned, product category effects are
not accounted for in the study. Would the results found in the current study be consistent
across the various departments of the grocery store?
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Would the results have been

different across product categories outside of consumer goods? These questions remain
unanswered. Product category is an important distinction to make because channel
allowances have long ago moved beyond the grocery retail segment. In a pre-study
interview with a senior key account salesperson was asked a question about slotting
allowances he replied by saying ―Slotting allowances are primarily a retail grocery
practice‖. In fact, that has not been the case for over a decade. Allowances of all type
have moved beyond grocery and into many areas including online retailing. In part, the
proliferation of channel allowances is due to the FDA‘s lack of enthusiasm for
controlling or halting the practice. Based on the government‘s lack of interest and the
marketplace incentives, channel allowances are certain to grow exponentially across
virtually all areas of the global economy. In sum, this limitation is a significant one.
Finally, and as discussed to some extent previously, there was a clear difference
in terms of power and dependence between the selling firm and the retail customers
included in this study.

That is, the selling firm was the powerful partner in the

relationship while the customer was the most dependent. This limitation may have
contributed to the unexpected finding that high perceived control over channel
allowances decreases the salesperson performance with the customer. In other words, the
customer does not like to be dependent on a salesperson representing a more powerful
selling firm. Given the current study, there is no way to know if this power difference
contributed to the observed effect. In fairness, it would be extremely difficult to find a
scenario in which power was equal between the customer and salesperson in a businessto-business exchange.

This limitation indicates the need for more controlled

experimental research in the area of channel allowances.

FUTURE RESEARCH
The practice of selling firms paying channel allowances continues to grow, however,
research in this area is lacking. Therefore, future research in the domain of channel
allowances is ripe with opportunity. First, there is an existing control in the marketplace
based on government regulations. That is, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms
(BATF) has banned the practice of paying or requiring channel allowances for alcoholic
products. However, the rest of the consumable goods market is regulated by the Food
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and Drug Administration (FDA) and the FDA has not banned this practice for the sale of
other consumer goods. What this means is that a carbonated soft drink salesperson is
competing for the same space in the retail grocery store that the beer salesperson desires.
However, the soft drink salesperson can offer to pay the retailer for the space while the
beer salesperson cannot. Regardless of the inherit lack of fairness this may create, a
more interesting question is what effect does the presence of a channel allowance have
on the relationship between these two salespeople and the retail customer?
A second direction for future research regarding channel allowances is to study
different effects based on the intended purpose of the allowance. For example, does it
matter if a salesperson is offering to pay for shelf space versus offering to pay for a
promotion? One may infer that a promotion would be of more benefit to the retailer if it
is designed to generate store traffic. It may benefit the selling firm and the retailer to
structure channel allowances around promotions and make shelf or display space a
requirement as part of the promotion.

This could effectively eliminate slotting

allowances, display allowances, and pay-to-stay fees by making these elements part of
the promotional allowance agreement. Future research may address these questions and
provide a more definitive answer.
Third, it would be beneficial to attempt to generalize the findings of this study
across other retail context and product categories.

While replication in a different

context may not be advantageous in terms of a cost-benefit analysis, researchers in the
future would be wise to examine multiple channel allowance phenomena across a variety
of retail channels and product categories. Much of the existing literature, including the
current study, is embedded on the retail consumer goods segment. More specifically,
many of the studies involve consumable goods sold in grocery stores. It would benefit
the area of channel allowance research to convey a message that this is not just a grocery
store phenomenon. In fact, the practice has been growing rapidly beyond the grocery
segment for the past two decades. Hopefully, future research will be able to keep up with
the pace.
Finally, as suggested in the discussion on limitations, researchers will find it
challenging to identify a real world customer-salesperson relationship in which channel
allowances are involved and power between the exchange partners is equal. This signals
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the need for future experimental research regarding channel allowances. Only within the
confines of a highly controlled experiment may researchers have the ability to set power
and dependence equal in one condition while allowing it different across two others.
Assuming differential effects are found in the experimental setting, a series of follow-up
studies would be needed to generalize the findings to actual customer-salesperson
relationships. Without doubt, this would require a great deal of effort but would prove
exceedingly beneficial to channels of distribution researchers as well as those interested
in channel allowances and power-dependence theory.

SUMMARY
This dissertation has taken the initial step in understanding the effects of the customer‘s
perception of the salesperson‘s control over channel allowances in a business-to-business
exchange. However, much work is still needed in this regard. Sales managers and
salespeople alike may be well advised to convey a low level of salesperson control over
channel allowances, especially if the objective is to maximize both customer loyalty
toward the firm and salesperson performance simultaneously. With a continuing lack of
government regulation, researchers seeking rewarding and fruitful opportunities for
future research will find riches in the area of channel allowances as this practice
continues to expand across the marketplace.
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